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ATROCITIES?
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JIDE NZELIBE**
Contemporary justifications for international criminal tribunals
(ICTs), especially the permanent International Criminal Court,
often stress the role of such tribunals in deterring future
humanitarian atrocities. But hardly any academic commentary has
attempted to explore in depth this deterrence rationale. This essay
utilizes economic models of deterrence to analyze whether a
potential perpetrator of humanitarian atrocities would likely be
deterred by the risk offuture prosecution by an ICT. According to
the economic theory of deterrence, two factors-certainty and
severity of punishment-are central to the reduction of crime after
taking into account a particularindividual'spreferencefor risk. In
the context of a possible ICT prosecution, isolating the pool of
individuals likely to commit humanitarianatrocities is difficult but
not insurmountable. Given that internationaltribunalsare not likely
to have independent police powers in the foreseeable future, the
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actors most likely to face prosecution are individuals in weak states
who have failed politically. In other words, the likely pool will be
composed of individuals in weak states who have been forcedfrom
political power by local or foreign forces. Examining evidence
concerning the fates offailed coup plotters and dictatorsin Africaa group that represents a pool of likely perpetratorsof atrocitieswe show that the probability that this pool of individuals will be
subject to a range of other legal and extra-legal sanctions is quite
high. Moreover, the severity of the sanctions these individuals are
likely to face-death, life imprisonment, and torture-is also likely
to be higher than those imposed by an ICT. Thus, prosecution by an
ICT will often serve as a weaker substitute, rather than a
complement, to pre-existing sanctions. In one situation, however,
the threat of ICT prosecution is likely to complement otherpossible
sanctions and serve as a deterrent-where the perpetrator is
unlikely to be subject to other sanctions because he is consideredto
be politically indispensable. But in such circumstances, the ex ante
benefits of deterrence from ICT prosecution will likely be
outweighed by the ex post harms of prosecuting a spoiler-an
individual whose prosecution is likely to generate local political
instability. In other words, the prospect of prosecution by an ICT
may sometimes exacerbate the risks of humanitarian atrocities.
Finally, prosecution by an ICT may also exacerbate conflicts
through a political opportunism effect in which localpoliticians will
have an incentive to free-ride off ICT efforts and turn a blind eye to
the kinds of institutional reforms that are more likely to prevent
future atrocities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of humanitarian atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,
Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, international criminal
tribunals (ICTs), including the permanent International Criminal Court
(ICC), have become a regular fixture of the international legal scene.
Indeed, the establishment of the ICC in 2000 was considered a milestone
by many international lawyers, with the New York Times calling it "the
biggest change in international law in decades." ' For the most part,
contemporary justifications for these tribunals stress their potential to deter
future humanitarian atrocities. The emerging consensus in human rights
circles is that international criminal tribunals are necessary to address what
former prosecutor Louise Arbour of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has called "the entrenched culture of impunity"
where "the enforcement of humanitarian law is the exception and not the
rule.", 2 More importantly, the member states that created these new
tribunals have not minced words about what they expect these entities to
achieve. For instance, the Security Council Resolution that established the
ICTY boldly proclaims that the purpose of that tribunal is "to put an end to
measures to bring to justice
[international atrocities] and to take effective
3
them.",
for
responsible
are
who
persons
the
But is such widespread optimism about the deterrence potential of ICTs
warranted? For instance, is there any credible evidence that there is an

1. Barbara Crossette, U.S. Gains a Compromise on War Crimes Tribunal,N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2000, at A6.
2. Louise Arbour, The Prosecution of InternationalCrimes: Prospects and Pitfalls, I WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 13, 23 (1999).
3. S.C. Res. 827, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/
Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm (follow link for "Resolution 827").

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:777

"underlying culture of impunity" in which perpetrators of genocidal
violence routinely face little or no prospect of sanctions? More
importantly, how do we know that the pool of individuals likely to commit
such atrocities will be meaningfully deterred by the threat of an ICT
prosecution? Finally, is it possible that ICT prosecutions could exacerbate
the risk of humanitarian atrocities in weak or failing states by reducing the
incentives of political spoilers to participate in peace processes?
Despite the salience of these questions, hardly any academic
commentary has explored in depth the merits of the deterrence justification
for ICTs. More often, the deterrence claim is simply asserted or rejected
without much empirical or theoretical analysis. 4 As far as we know, this
Article represents one of the first comprehensive efforts to address these
questions by applying an economic model of deterrence to a set of
empirical data reflecting likely targets of ICT prosecutions.5
We argue that, for both legal and political reasons, ICT prosecutions
will be directed almost exclusively at individuals engaged in civil conflict
within weak or failing states. Focusing on the fates of failed coup plotters
in Africa-a pool of individuals who are likely to commit humanitarian
atrocities in weak or failed states-we show that there is a significant
likelihood that these individuals would face sanctions that are both more
certain and severe than any sanction that would be meted out by an ICT.
Thus, in many circumstances, an ICT prosecution will serve as a weaker
substitute, rather than a complement, to preexisting sanctions against
likely ICT targets.
Furthermore, contrary to the culture of impunity thesis, we suggest that
offenders commit more atrocities in weak states because they have more
opportunities to do so, and not because they have a greater inclination to
commit such atrocities. Because of norms of political accountability and
strong state institutions, potential offenders in more mature states face
significant constraints on their ability to mobilize violent groups and
engage in large-scale humanitarian atrocities. Thus, the higher frequency

4. Indeed, Mark Drumbl faults both the realist skeptics and optimists for the lack of empirical
support for their respective positions on the deterrent value of ICTs. See Mark Drumbl, Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 548
(2005) ("My sense, however, is that th[e] [realist] scholarship is driven more by ideology than by
empiricism. In the end, it is as blindly un-nurturing as the celebration of international criminal justice
institutions is blindly nurturing.").
5. One notable recent exception is Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for
Effectiveness? A Model of the InternationalCriminal Regime, 60 INT'L ORG. 935 (2006) (using game
theoretic model to suggest that international criminal tribunals might deter leaders from committing
atrocities at the margin). However, Gilligan's model is theoretical and avoids reaching any empirical
conclusions.
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of humanitarian atrocities in weak or failed states may be due to the lack
of credible institutions and mechanisms within those states that can
constrain likely perpetrators of such atrocities. In other words, dictators or
rebels in weak states may commit more atrocities not because they do not
have to fear any sanctions, but because they have more occasions to
engage in such heinous acts. But the deterrence rationale for ICTs fails to
distinguish fundamentally between those "push" factors that motivate
individuals to commit atrocities from those "pull" factors that make such
atrocities possible.
In fact, in certain circumstances, we argue, ICTs might actually
exacerbate humanitarian atrocities by prosecuting individuals whose
political cooperation is critical to successful peace negotiations in weak or
failed states. In such states, political bargains among the elites-including
belligerents and spoilers-are often necessary for democratic
consolidation and political stability. But since ICT prosecutions are likely
to target those individuals whose cooperation is often necessary for
political stability, the prosecutions are likely to undermine such bargains
or make such bargains unlikely in the first place. Moreover, greater
enforcement by an ICT may cause more instability through a perverse
political opportunism effect. In other words, since politicians in weak
states have an incentive to use ICT prosecutions to accomplish domestic
political goals that have little to do with promoting international justice,
the formation of an ICT may encourage such politicians to under-invest in
domestic institutions or mechanisms that will constrain future genocidal
violence.
We wish to add one important caveat to our analysis. This Article does
not claim that deterrence is the only plausible justification for ICTs.
Indeed, proponents of ICTs have pointed to other worthwhile systemic
goals such as the reinforcement of rule of law norms and the need to
"honor and redeem the suffering of the individual victim(s)."' 6 We do not
take any position here as to whether ICTs can successfully accomplish
these other goals. Even recognizing these other possible rationales for
ICTs, however, many judges and commentators have argued that
deterrence should be the primary objective of a criminal enforcement

6. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2544 n.22 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also Diane Marie
Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2:2 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 93, 118-20 (2002)
(focusing on expressivist rationale for ICTs); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and
Accountability of ProsecutorialDiscretionat the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510,
543 (2003) (observing that ICTs combine a retributive and deterrent approach).
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system.7 Moreover, many prominent international legal academics, as well
as the ICTs themselves, have emphatically proclaimed deterrence as a
significant justification for the creation of ICTs. 8
We also do not engage the burgeoning literature criticizing the efficacy
of the ICC because it has not gained the cooperation of powerful countries
like the United States. 9 While acknowledging that power politics will
sometimes play a critical role in the efficacy of international institutions, 10

7. See I JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 517, 520-21 (Robert Campbell ed.,
Thoemmes Continuum 4th ed. 2002) (1879); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219

(6th ed. 2003); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1, at
103 (2d ed, 1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has also declared deterrence and
retribution to be the key objectives of criminal punishment. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
361-62 (1997); Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 794 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Our double jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will be considered punishment to the
extent that it serves only the purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering any
nonpunitive objective."); see also Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(observing that "the core purpose of the criminal law" is "to regulate behavior by threatening
unpleasant consequences should an individual commit a harmful act").
8. See Overview of the Rome Statute of the International Court (1998-1999), http://www.
un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm (describing "effective deterrence [as] a primary objective of
those working to establish the international criminal court") (last visited Nov. 30, 2006); see also
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES

TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 218-19 (1997) (emphasizing deterrence role of ICTs); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
CombatingImpunity for InternationalCrimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) ("The pursuit of
justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills fundamental human values, helps achieve peace and
reconciliation, and contributes to the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts."). Richard
Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY, has also stressed the potential deterrence effect of
ICTs:
If people in leadership positions know there's an international court out there, that there's an
international prosecutor, and that the international community is going to act as an
international police force, I just cannot believe that they aren't going to think twice as to the
consequences. Until now, they haven't had to. There's been no enforcement mechanism at all.
Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, An Appraisal of the First InternationalWar Crimes
Tribunalsince Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 868 (1997) (quoting Goldstone).
9. See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States and the InternationalCriminal
Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002); John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International
Criminal Court from America's Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2001); Jack
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (2003);
Michael Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L.
REV. 156 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in Rome, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20 (1998). Jenia
lontcheva Turner has also argued that the lack of support for the ICC from key players such as the
United States suggests that a less centralized approach to criminal enforcement might be appropriate.
See Jenia lontcheva Turner, NationalizingInternationalCriminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2005).
Posner and Yoo have argued that the United States withdrawal from the ICC reflects the unwillingness
of the United States to be subject to an entity it could not control. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo,
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 67-70 (2005). For a
comprehensive discussion of the United States approach to the ICC negotiations during the Clinton
Administration, see David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47 (2002).
10. For a perspective that argues that the United States resistance to the Treaty of Rome does not
reflect deep moral or analytical concerns but it mostly motivated by politics, see Mariano-Florentino
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our critique of the role of international criminal tribunals is much broader
and more fundamental. We contend that even when there is support for
ICTs by powerful countries like the United States, it is still very likely that
ICTs will play a marginal, if not counterproductive, role in deterring
humanitarian atrocities in the weak or failing states where such atrocities
are most likely to be committed.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II briefly summarizes the main
theoretical and empirical assumptions about the capacity of ICTs to deter
humanitarian atrocities. We argue that most of these assumptions are
dubious, or at a minimum, highly debatable, especially because these
assumptions rarely take into account the fact that ICT prosecutions are
usually limited to weak or failed states. Part III develops a framework
based on the economic model of deterrence to examine the probable
deterrent effects of an ICT. Part IV then applies that deterrence model to
data on the fates of failed coup plotters in Africa-a pool of individuals
likely to be subject to prosecution by an ICT. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, this data suggests that the coup plotters in Africa are not likely to
be deterred from committing humanitarian atrocities by the prospect of
prosecution by ICTs. Indeed, these individuals are already subject to the
risk of a range of sanctions that are usually both much more severe and
certain than any sanction that could be meted out by an ICT. Part V
sketches briefly an alternative explanation for recurring humanitarian
atrocities in weak or failed states that has been overlooked by proponents
of ICTs: the opportunity rather than the willingness or motive to commit
such atrocities. Part VI explores some of the perverse consequences of
prosecution by ICTs, many of which are rooted in the fallible institutional
structures and insecurities of regimes in weak or failed states.
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE DETERRENCE ARGUMENTS FOR ICTS
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of
international criminal tribunals empowered to punish individuals for
violations of international crimes. One of the primary justifications for
ICT prosecutions of individuals who commit humanitarian atrocities is
that such prosecutions will promote reconciliation and deter future actors
from committing such atrocities." The importance of this rationale to the

Cullar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Antitreaty Discourse, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
11. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 11 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 319, 328 (1999) ("As instruments of deterrence, the tribunals are formidable partners that cannot
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pro-ICT movement is highlighted by wide academic support for
permanent as opposed to ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Unlike ad
hoc ICTs, supporters of ICTs have argued that a permanent International
Criminal Court will be more likely to deter future humanitarian atrocities.
A. The Rise of InternationalCriminal Tribunals
The idea of establishing international criminal tribunals to punish war
crimes and humanitarian atrocities dates back to at least the end of World
War I, when the victorious Allies agreed to hold international war crimes
trials for Germany's defeated emperor Wilhelm II as well as other alleged
German war criminals. 12 Although this plan was eventually thwarted by
Holland's refusal to surrender the exiled Kaiser and by Germany's postwar resistance, the idea that serious international atrocities require an
international as opposed to a domestic criminal process was first
established during this period. 13
At the end of World War II, the victorious Allies resolved to improve
upon their earlier efforts by establishing international trials for German
and Japanese war criminals. The most famous of these international trials
was held in Nuremberg, Germany. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson served as one of the chief prosecutors, and the judges hailed from
the Allied victors. For many international law scholars, the Nuremberg
trials established crucial precedents for the recognition and enforcement of
international law norms against serious war crimes and atrocities like
genocide by international, rather than domestic, tribunals. 14
The success of Nuremberg loomed large during the Balkan wars of the
1990s when Europe faced its first major armed conflict since the end of
World War II. Drawing on the Nuremberg example and responding to
pressure from international human rights organizations, the United Nations
Security Council agreed in 1993 to create that organization's first

be lightly ignored in the future.").
12. See Treaty of Peace with Germany art. 227, June 28, 1919 (Treaty of Versailles), availableat
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html (agreeing to publicly "arraign
[Kaiser] for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties" before
international court with judges from America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan); see also id. art. 228
(requiring surrender of any other Germans who had "committed acts in violation of the laws and
customs of war"). For a general discussion of these trials, see GARY A. BASS, STAYING THE HAND OF
VENGEANCE 75-105 (2000).

13. See BASS, supra note 12, at 104-05.
14. See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, TransitionalJustice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615,
1615 (2006) ("Nuremberg established the principle of individual criminal accountability for human
rights violations perpetrated against civilians in wartime: that certain crimes are so heinous that they
violate the 'law of nations' and may be prosecuted anywhere.").
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international tribunal empowered to punish individuals for war crimes and
humanitarian atrocities.' 5 The establishment of this tribunal, known as the
ICTY, was followed in 1996 by the establishment of a second
international criminal tribunal to punish perpetrators of atrocities during
were also set up to punish
the 1994 Rwandan civil war. Similar tribunals
6
atrocities in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.'
All of these tribunals are ad hoc tribunals with limited jurisdiction,
usually confined to atrocities arising out of a particular conflict, and whose
mandates will eventually expire.' 7 In 2002, however, a number of
countries agreed to establish a permanent International Criminal Court
(ICC) with broad jurisdiction over atrocities occurring in the territory of
any state party to the ICC treaty. 18 Nearly one hundred countries have
signed and ratified the ICC statute. 19
Despite their differences, all international criminal tribunals share some
important characteristics. Importantly, all of the ICTs are avowedly
international rather than national institutions. Created by international
agreement or the action of an international institution like the U.N.
Security Council, the ICTs are purposely staffed by nationals who take an
oath of "independence" and who are not responsible to their home
countries. 20
For both legal and political reasons, any ICT prosecutions in the
foreseeable future will be targeted almost exclusively at offenders in weak
or failed states. 21 All existing ad hoc ICTs, for instance, require U.N.
15. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
scres/1993/scres93.htm (follow link for "Resolution 808"). For a detailed overview of the
establishment and operation of the ICTY, including the personal dynamics of the prosecutors who
staffed the court, see JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE INTHE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE
HAGUE TRIBUNAL (2003).

16. Both the Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals are different in that they are "hybrid" tribunals
mixing local, national judges with international ones. The ICTY and ICTR are purely international
tribunals without any judges or prosecutors from the countries involved in the conflicts. For a defense
of these hybrid tribunals, see Turner, supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1503, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscresolutions03.htm (follow link for "Security Council resolution
1503") (calling "on the ICTY and the ICTR to take all possible measures to complete investigations by
the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all
work in 2010" and amending authorizing statutes to do so).
18. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
19. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/
statesparties.html (for list of states parties to Rome Statute).
20. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 40.
21. Weak and failed states are generally defined as states that cannot deliver basic political
"goods" like security, education, health services, or economic opportunity. See Robert I. Rotberg, The
New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WASH. Q., Summer 2002, at 85-87.
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Security Council resolutions to authorize prosecution of crimes and all
have been targeted toward weak or failed states like Rwanda or
Yugoslavia. Understandably, there have been no serious proposals for
establishing ad hoc ICTs to investigate or prosecute potential offenses by
strong veto-wielding states like Russia or the United States because of the
necessity of a Security Council resolution. Similarly, the legal mandate of
the ICC is limited to "the most serious crimes of international concern"
including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression--offenses that are more likely to occur in weak or
dysfunctional states.2 2 Moreover, the ICC's jurisdiction extends only to the
territories or nationals of states that have acceded to the Rome Statute.23
Finally, the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction if a state party is "unwilling
or unable" to genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution of a
potential offense. 24
The combined effect of these legal limitations is that mature states,
especially those with powerful militaries which might otherwise be
exposed to ICC prosecution, can avoid the reach of the ICC simply by
refusing to join the ICC Statute. Indeed, some of the most militarily
powerful and populous countries in the world (China, Russia, Turkey,
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States) have either
refused to sign or refused to ratify the ICC Statute.25 The United States has
gone farther and signed a number of "Article 98" agreements requiring
states that are party to the ICC to grant immunity to U.S. troops operating
in those states. 26 Even powerful states that have joined the ICC, like
Australia, the United Kingdom, and France, are somewhat protected from

22. Rome Statute, supranote 18, art. 5.
23. Id.art. 13.
24. Id. art. 17(1) (directing ICC to refuse to admit cases where "[tihe case is being investigated
or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution" or where "[t]he case has been investigated by a
State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute").
25. See International Criminal Court, supra note 19. See also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2006) (the United States, China, India, Turkey, and Israel all rank in the top twenty military powers,
ranked by military expenditures). As Goldsmith argues, strong states like the United States that have
large overseas military commitments are highly unlikely to join the ICC unless that institution is
subject to political control through the Security Council. Goldsmith, supra note 9.
26. The United States appears to have signed nearly 100 such agreements. See Richard Boucher,
Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (announcing signing of 100th agreement); see
generally Rachel Harkavy, Picking Our Battles: A Strategy for the United States in the Wake of

Mexico's Becoming a State Party to the InternationalCriminal Court, 40 GA. L. REV. 915, 919 n. 10
(2006).
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ICC prosecutions because those states are likely to satisfy the ICC's
international due process standards for investigating and prosecuting
potential offenders on a domestic level.27
B. InternationalCriminalJustice and Deterrence
Despite these limitations, the creation of the ICC and the continued
work of the ad hoc tribunals represent a huge victory for supporters of a
system of international criminal justice. Legal academics have been some
of the most vocal and prominent advocates for creating and supporting
ICTs. Most of the academic literature has eschewed normative
justifications for ICTs and focused on improving the institutional design of
ICTs to ensure their effectiveness. 28 To the extent academic supporters
have bothered to offer justifications for the creation and support of ICTs in
general, and the ICC in particular, they almost always claim that ICTs can
deter or prevent future humanitarian atrocities.29
The deterrence rationale for ICTs usually takes the form of a
generalized argument in favor of justice for perpetrators of humanitarian
atrocities and in opposition to impunity and realpolitik. This rationale
assumes not only that ICTs provide retribution for victims of war crimes
and atrocities by punishing perpetrators, but that the very pursuit of justice
can also prevent future atrocities. As one of the leading advocates for ICTs
explains, "[t]he pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental
human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and
deterrence of future conflicts." 30 The millions of victims of humanitarian
atrocities provide "grim testament to the failure of the international
community to ... prevent aggression and enforce international

27. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 17(2) (directing ICC to consider "principles of due process
recognized by international law" when determining whether state is unable or unwilling to prosecute).
Consensus on exactly how to apply these principles was missing at the original conference establishing
the court. See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
28. See Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (2003); Mark
Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751
(2005).

29. Some academics have recognized the problems with assuming an ICT can deter atrocities,
although most do so only in the context of proposals to increase the use and powers of ICTs so as to
increase the likelihood of deterrence. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Assessing InternationalCriminal
Adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 169, 174 (2000-2003);
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution
of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002).
30. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over
Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 192 (2003).
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humanitarian law." 3 1 Indeed, former ICTY judge Antonio Cassese
suggests that the failed efforts to punish the perpetrators of the Armenian
genocide "gave a nod and a wink to3 2Adolf Hitler and others to pursue the
Holocaust some twenty years later.
This broad notion that justice will deter future atrocities (or that failing
to provide justice will encourage future ones) is reflected in the preamble
to the statute creating the International Criminal Court. That statute, which
has been signed and ratified by nearly 171 countries, declares that the ICC
is "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators. '..3 and thus
to contribute to the prevention of [serious international] crimes.
Elaborations of the relationship between ICT justice and deterrence
take two forms. First, some advocates have suggested that ICTs are
uniquely positioned to prevent atrocities in the long term by fostering
conditions for the emergence of a political culture where such atrocities
are no longer acceptable. As Payam Akhavan, a former legal advisor to the
ICTY has explained, ICT prosecutions can establish "unconscious
inhibitions against crime" or a "condition of habitual lawfulness" 34 in a
society where such atrocities were previously accepted.
Second, and more commonly, ICT supporters have argued that ICTs
will have immediate deterrence effects as long as they are designed
properly and provided adequate authority and resources. Deterrence of
atrocities will occur when ICTs can achieve the same frequency and
consistency in the prosecution of international crimes as domestic legal
systems achieve in the prosecution of domestic crimes. Deterrence thus
requires further support for ICTs and superior institutional design.
Professor Meron's formulation is indicative of this view: "Instead of
despairing over the prospects of deterrence, the international community
should enhance the probability of punishment by encouraging
prosecutions before the national courts, especially of third states, by
making ad hoc Tribunals effective,35 and by establishing a vigorous,
standing international criminal court."

31. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New InternationalCriminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 384 (2000).
32. See Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1
(1998).
33. Rome Statute, supra note 18, Preamble (emphasis added).
34. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 16 (2001) (quoting Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative

Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1966)).
35.

Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 110-11 (1995).
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Indeed, a 2005 diplomatic dispute over the U.N. Security Council's
referral of Sudan to the new International Criminal Court demonstrates the
central importance of deterrence to supporters of ICTs. The United States
initially opposed a referral of Sudan to the ICC, and advocated instead for
the creation of an ad hoc tribunal on the model of the ICTR-the tribunal
used in Rwanda.36 Thus, at least publicly, the United States favored an
international criminal prosecution of atrocities committed in Sudan.37The
only dispute was over which type of ICT to use: ad hoc or permanent.
Despite the United States' support for active prosecution of Sudanese
war criminals, leading non-governmental organizations and ICT advocates
sharply criticized the United States' opposition to an ICC referral. While
conceding that ad hoc ICTs could prosecute and punish perpetrators in
Sudan, they argued that such ad hoc ICTs could not deter future
atrocities. 38 Unlike a permanent ICC, the ad hoc ICTs are only created
after a particular set of atrocities occurs and with a necessarily limited
jurisdiction. A permanent ICC prosecution would not only punish
individuals in Sudan, but also deter future atrocities in places other than
Sudan. 39 The Sudan ICC referral flap highlights the importance of
deterrence to ICT supporters. If the ICTs were justified on purely
retributive grounds irrespective of deterrence effects, then the pre-ICC
system of selective ad hoc ICTs would be equally attractive as the ICC. It
is deterrence, however, that gives the ICC its distinctive rationale.
All versions of the ICT deterrence rationale rely on some version of the
"culture of impunity" thesis. This is the assumption that ICTs can deter
future atrocities by ending a culture where offenders escape sanctions for
committing humanitarian atrocities. By subjecting such offenders to the
credible threat of an ad hoc ICT or ICC prosecution, such a culture of
impunity would slowly be undermined. Realizing that an ICT prosecution
is possible, offenders would be more likely to refrain from committing

36. See Warren Hoge, U.S. Lobbies U.N. on Darfur and InternationalCourt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

29, 2005, at A8.
37. For a description of the U.S. government's official position, see Richard Boucher,
Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
dpb/2005/41453.htm. The United States eventually relented and abstained from a vote referring Sudan
to the ICC.
38. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Why Should We Shield the Killers?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at
A21 (quoting Kenneth Roth, spokesman for Human Rights Watch, who stated "[t]he I.C.C. could start

tomorrow saving lives ... [but w]ith the [ad hoc] tribunal route, you're talking about another year of
killing").
39. See id.; see also Samantha Power, Court of First Resort, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A23

(arguing that permanent court is more effective than ad hoc court).
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atrocities. 4 0 As Elizabeth Kiss puts it, "just as wounds fester when they are
not exposed to the open air, so unacknowledged injustice can poison
societies and produce the cycles of distrust,4 1hatred, and violence that we
have witnessed in many parts of the world.",
C. Evaluatingthe DeterrenceEffect of ICTs
Although deterrence of future humanitarian atrocities is plainly an
important justification for establishing ICTs, the problem of deterrence has
been addressed almost exclusively in the context of scholarship analyzing
the institutional design and effectiveness of ICTs.42 Most of the
scholarship tends to analyze, often from a very normative point of view,
whether ICTs are effective in bringing justice to war-tom communities

and deterring future perpetrators of atrocities, given certain institutional
design features.4 3 For instance, Professor David Wippman argues that
specific institutional limitations of the ICC, such as the requirement of a
Security Council referral if a state does not assent to jurisdiction, make it
unlikely that the ICC will be able to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities
in many internal conflicts. 44 But there is almost no scholarship attempting
to analyze whether, as an empirical matter, ICTs are likely to have, or
actually have had, any deterrence effect on perpetrators of humanitarian
atrocities.4 5

40. Some evidence for this thesis is offered by anecdotes, such as this one from leading ICT
advocate Samantha Power:
Skeptics say that international courts will never deter determined warlords. Musa Hilal, the
coordinator of the deadly Janjaweed militia in Darfur, gave me a very different impression
when I met with him soon after the Bush administration had named him as a potential
suspect. He had left Darfur and was living in Khartoum, courting journalists in the hopes of
improving his reputation. Almost as soon as I sat down with him, he began his defense. Like
his victims, he had only one place on his mind. "I do not belong at the Hague," he said.
Power, supranote 39.
41. Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on
Retroactive Justice,in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 68, 71-72 (Robert

I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
42. See, e.g., Sadat & Carden, supra note 31, at 384.
43. See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2031, 2079-80 (1998) (doubting the effectiveness of deterrence in context of mass violence); Mark A.
Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1221, 1254-55 (2000) (doubting the deterrence value of the ICTY and the ICTR for crimes against
humanity).
44. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 13 (authorizing jurisdiction of ICC only in cases
referred by a member of the ICC or by a referral from the U.N. Security Council).
45. The only exceptions to this dearth of scholarship are found in the international relations
literature. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002); Jack Snyder & Leslie
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One possible reason for the dearth of empirical studies on the
deterrence effect of ICTs is that such studies are not possible. For instance,
some commentators have argued that debates about deterrence in the ICT
context are misplaced because there is no way to prove empirically that
any particular ICT prosecution deters crime.4 6 While these commentators
are correct to suggest that proof of a perpetrator's state of mind will often
prove difficult if not impossible to measure, it is not clear that such proof
is at all necessary to measure the likelihood of deterrence.
An alternative approach would be to measure the correlation between
the prosecution of certain crimes and the change in the levels of such
crimes, an approach that is commonly used in empirical assessments of the
prosecution of domestic crimes. 47 Furthermore, one can employ a risk
assessment approach to measure the empirical probability that a
perpetrator will be deterred by a particular sanction, given the existence of
preexisting informal or formal sanctions, as we do in this paper. This
approach tries to assess the current risks associated with the commission
of certain crimes and asks whether future deterrence measures alter those
risks.
Given the importance of the deterrence rationale for supporters of
ICTs, the lack of any empirical inquiry into this rationale in existing ICT
scholarship is deeply unsatisfying. To the extent that ICTs continue to play
a key role in international relations, the empirical question can no longer
remain unaddressed. In the next two sections, we offer a model for
measuring the deterrence effects of ICTs and an empirical study designed
to test this model.

Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of InternationalJustice, 28
INT'L SEC. 5 (Winter 2003-2004); see also Miklos Biro et al., Attitudes Toward Justice and Social
Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY, 183, 192-95 (Eric Stover & Harvey M.
Weinstein eds., 2004) (reporting on surveys of post-war Balkan populations about ICTs).
46. David Scheffer, Should the United States Join the International Criminal Court, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 45, 51 (2002). Scheffer states:
[W]hen you have a permanent international court standing, I think there will be a possible
deterrence effect. For people to say there will be no deterrence at all is as factually

unprovable as to say there will be deterrence. You can't prove that. How do you prove that?
How do you prove the state of mind of a perpetrator of these crimes... ?
Id.; see also LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM 51 (2002)
("Certainly, it is hoped, although not empirically demonstrable, that erecting a system of international
criminal justice ... will prevent the reoccurrence of abuses and assist in repairing the havoc wreaked

upon society thereby.").
47. See Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301 (1988); Steven D. Levitt, Why Do IncreasedArrest Rates Appear to Reduce
Crime: Deterrence,Incapacitation,or Measurement Error?36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998).
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III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF CRIME: THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE

A theory for how deterrence prevents crime is developed most
thoroughly in economics literature. According to that literature, the two
key elements contributing to the reduction of crime are the certainty and
the severity of punishment.4 8 In a public enforcement model, certainty
captures the overall likelihood that a criminal will be punished for his
misdeeds; it is an element that combines the probability of arrest with the
probability that the criminal will be convicted after arrest. Severity of
punishment refers to the consequences of increasing the punitive quality of
the punishment, such as extending the length of a prison term or
substituting the death penalty for imprisonment. Overall, the theoretical
model suggests that whether or not a criminal will commit an act depends
on his view of the possibility of a sanction; he will only commit a crime
when the expected benefits exceed the expected sanction.
The relative weight of severity versus that of certainty in deterring
crime has been the source of much debate in the economics literature of
crime.4 9 For the purposes of this paper, we need not engage that debate; it
suffices that both severity and certainty play a role in deterring crime.
Moreover, as Tullock has observed, this question may not necessarily be
relevant:
Suppose a potential criminal has a choice between two punishment
systems: One gives each person who commits burglary a one-in-100
chance of serving one year in prison; in the other there is a one-in1,000 chance of serving ten years. It is not obvious to me that
burglars would be very differently affected by these two punishment
systems. 50

In any event, the formal thrust of much of the literature is to determine
whether the sanction is set at a high enough level to optimize deterrence
after balancing the social costs of the activity against the costs of
enforcement.
The theoretical logic that underpins the economic model of deterrence
is both compelling and seductive. However, it is subject to two key

48. See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 48, at 172; S. Decker & C.W. Kohfield, Certainty,Severity, and
the Probability of Crime: A Logistic Analysis, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 2 (1990); Sylvia Mendes & M.D.
McDonald, PuttingSeverity Back in the DeterrencePackage, 29 POL'Y STUD. J. 588 (2001).
50. Gordon Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime, 36 PUB. INT. 103, 107 (1974) (citations
omitted).
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qualifications. First, the model must account for an individual criminal's
preference for risk. 51 All else being equal, the stronger the preference for
risk, the more severe the sanction has to be for it to be effective. Under
certain circumstances, individual preferences for certain benefits of crime
can be so strong that the risk of sanctions has little or no deterrent effect.
For instance, Margalioth and Blumkin use the example of the suicide
terrorist to illustrate one group for whom sanctions will have no deterrence
effect.52 They argue that since the suicide terrorist is willing to make the
ultimate sacrifice in carrying out his criminal enterprise, only
incapacitation can serve the goal of minimizing suicide terrorist threats. 3
Second, the general deterrence model must account for the availability
of extra-legal or informal sanctions. These often refer to informal self-help
54
sanctions such as shame, victim retaliation, or other vigilante actions.
For instance, in their study of drug robberies, Jacobs et al. show that those
who rob drug dealers face significant risks of grave informal sanctions;
since the drug dealers cannot report the crime to the authorities, they have
strong incentives to retaliate. 55 If both informal and formal sanctions exist
for a particular offense or legal violation, however, there is a risk that the
deterrent effect of the formal sanction will be discounted by a rational
offender.5 6 In other words, any criminal justice system that imposes a
weaker sanction than preexisting formal or informal alternatives is less
likely to produce a credible deterrent bite.
According to this view, a preexisting informal or formal sanction may
serve as a substitute for other formal sanctions because it may also exhibit

51. As Becker observed in his original deterrence model, the deterrence force of sanctions
depends on the individual's attitude towards risk. See Becker, supra note 48, at 178-79.
52. See Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, Targeting the Majority: Redesigning Racial
Profiling,24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 317.

53.

For a discussion of such informal threats, see Bruce Jacobs et al., Managing Retaliation:

DrugRobbery and Informal Sanction Threats, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 171 (2000).

54. See id. at 172-74.
55. See id. at 189.
56. Sometimes, the combined range of informal and formal sanctions for a particular crime may
be too high and thus result in over-deterrence. For some discussion of this phenomenon, see Richard
A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1745 (2005). Indeed, some
scholars have suggested that in a case where the legal sanction provides the optimal level of deterrence
for the relevant offense, then any resulting nonlegal sanctions should be deducted from the legal
sanctions. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctionsfrom Damages,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001). But where the underlying crime produces no countervailing social
benefit, such as genocide, mass rape, or murder, there is no real concern of over-deterrence. In such
situations, there is no amount of the targeted crime that would be socially desirable.
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similar, 57 if not more significant, deterrence effects. 58 Indeed, certain
scholars have argued that private deterrence efforts might actually
represent a more efficient alternative to public enforcement for fighting
certain kinds of criminal offenses, such as cybercrimes. 59 In any event, a
simple example illustrates how informal sanctions can substitute for public
enforcement efforts. Suppose a criminal has a 40% chance of getting
arrested when he commits a burglary and then a 50% chance of getting
convicted after getting arrested. Furthermore, suppose that if convicted
this same criminal will definitely serve a one-year sentence. Accordingly,
this criminal's expected formal sanction for committing burglary will be
equal to a 20% chance of serving a one-year sentence-or less than three
months. But if we also suppose that the same burglar also faces a 50%
chance of being subject to self-help retaliation by victims, this informal
sanction by the victims may simply overwhelm or displace the effect of
the formal sanction. In other words, the informal sanction may serve as a
stronger substitute for the formal sanction because it is likely to be both
more certain and severe. Thus, if we observe an individual committing a
burglary in this scenario, we may safely assume that the individual is not
likely to be easily deterred given the plausible range of the probabilities
and severities of sanctions.
Of course, our analysis does not suggest that a risk-loving individual
will be completely insensitive to the prospect of cumulative criminal
sanctions. Indeed, it is safe to assume that additional sanctions might have
some effect on a rational offender's calculus. But if the additional
sanctions are likely to be both less severe and less certain than preexisting
sanctions, then any further deterrent effect is likely to be marginal. Take,
for instance, the ongoing debates in the law and economics literature about
whether the death penalty actually deters homicides. 60 Certain
commentators have argued that if the prospect of being subject to the death

57. In economic parlance, substitutes refer to goods that compete with each other, while
complements refer to goods that go together. See WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 98 (4th ed. 1987).

58. See POSNER, supra note 7, § 22.1 (suggesting that public and private forms of crime
prevention efforts could be substitutes); see also Bruce Benson & Brent Mast, Privately Produced
General Deterrence,44 J.L. & ECON. 725, 727 (2001); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 343 (1984) ("[P]
ublic enforcement and private prevention are alternative means of reducing crime and ... there is an
inverse relationship between them.").
59. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1077-80
(2001).

60. For a survey of the literature, see John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
EmpiricalEvidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005).
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penalty is significantly low and if the punishment itself does not affect the
life expectancy of death row inmates, then it might not have much of a
deterrent effect. 6'
For instance, Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich show that as of 1997, only
2% of those on death row were actually executed, and even for this small
62
group there was a significant time-lag between sentencing and execution.
Comparing the relative frequency of prison death rates to the fates of those
on death row, they surmise that prison conditions are likely to have a
greater deterrent effect than capital punishment.63 More importantly, given
the empirically low probability of ever being subject to the death penalty,
they conclude that is unlikely that the "the fear of execution would be a
driving force in a rational criminal's calculus." 64 In other words, they
suggest that the cumulative effect of capital punishment is likely to
exercise only a marginal deterrent effect on a pool of offenders who
already face a significantly higher risk of dying because of prison
conditions. To be sure, by using this example we do not intend to endorse
any empirical result in the ongoing debates about the deterrent effects of
the death penalty. What is important is that examining the scope of
preexisting sanctions provides a promising methodological approach for
understanding the deterrent effect of additional sanctions in general.
One might argue that even if formal sanctions serve as imperfect
substitutes for informal sanctions, a society may still prefer to maintain
formal sanctions for expressive reasons. Regardless of the individual
deterrence effects of the formal sanction, we may still want to criminalize
certain activities in order to communicate to possible future offenders that
the society devalues such actions. 65 In this picture, the expressive function
of criminalizing the action may have a secondary deterrence value as a
form of public norm that discloses what a society is unwilling to tolerate
as acceptable social behavior. Some commentators have suggested that the

61. See Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, CapitalPunishment, and Deterrence,5 AM. L.
& EcON. REV. 318 (2003).
62. See id. at 319-20.
63. See id. at 320.
64. Id.
65. Stephanos Bibas & Richard Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 123 (2004) ("Offenders, victims, and society interpret the failure to
punish to mean that the crime is not really wrong and that the offender is free to keep doing it.");
Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1407-35 (2005) (demonstrating that perceived
legitimacy and enforcement of certain laws can affect how individuals perceive the legitimacy of other
aspects of the legal system); see Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 593 (1996) (observing that the goal of criminal punishment goes beyond inflicting harm on
specific individuals but also includes signifying the society's moral condemnation of an action).
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prosecution of humanitarian abusers by ICTs can also serve an expressive
function in communities afflicted by communal atrocities.66
But when a formal law criminalizes a certain activity, its expressive
function might still be very limited if existing informal or alternative
sanctions are severe enough. Indeed, the expressive function of a formal
sanction might become progressively diluted once there is a hierarchy of
alternative communities that also sanction the relevant activity. Consider
the following example. Suppose that a certain close-knit criminal gang
sanctions the stealing of drugs from other gang members with the penalty
of death. Suppose further that the relevant jurisdiction where the gang
members live decides to also sanction the stealing of drugs and makes it
punishable by a four-year maximum jail sentence. Would this latter
sanction have an expressive value to gang members that trumps the
expressive value of the sanction meted out by the gang leaders? Probably
not. Indeed, to the extent gang members may tend to identify more closely
with the gang than with the broader community, the expressive or
educative function of the formal sanction may be trivial or non-existent.
Of course, if the relevant alternative community that does the
sanctioning is even more well-defined than a local gang, for example a
nation-state within the international community of states, then additional
sanctions by the international community are likely to have even less of an
expressive or educative social value. As Jos6 Alvarez demonstrates with
respect to the Rwandan ad hoc tribunal, most victims preferred local
adjudicatory measures to ICTR prosecutions for the simple reason that
local tribunals were more likely to be responsive to victims' preferences
67
regarding issues of procedural and substantive justice.
Consequently, the relationship between formal and informal sanctions
underscores the need to examine the tradeoffs that occur when one
chooses among alternative enforcers. As Bruce Jacobs et al. have
observed, "[W]hy should offenders elect to reduce their chance of getting
arrested [by law enforcement] at the cost of increasing their odds of being
killed [by victims]?" ' 68 From a criminal policy perspective, the idea that
certain informal sanctions can displace the effect of formally imposed
sanctions should alert governments that investing their limited resources in
66. See Diane Marie Amann, supra note 6, at 118; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 592-95.
67. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 410-12 (1999) ("[I]nternational tribunals are accountable to, and respond most readily
to, international lawyers' jurisprudential and other agendas and only incidentally to the needs of
victims of mass atrocity.").
68. Bruce Jacobs et al., supra note 53, at 172.
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mechanisms that increase incapacitation of offenders may be more
effective than trying to influence the incentives of a category of criminals
who are not easily deterred.
IV. THE EVIDENCE OF THE FATES OF AFRICAN COUP PLOTTERS:
DEBUNKING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY THESIS
As discussed in Part I, the deterrence rationale for ICTs assumes that
there is a "culture of impunity" in weak states. As Sadat puts it, "One of
the primary obstacles to establishing the rule of law ...has been the

culture of impunity that has prevailed to date. Genocidal leaders flaunt
their crimes openly, unconcerned about international reaction, which they
suspect will range from willful blindness

. . .

to diplomatic censure ....,69

Commentators often argue that this purported culture of impunity tends to
exacerbate long-standing cleavages in vulnerable societies and makes
lasting peace arrangements impossible.7 °
At first glance, it does seem that many of the perpetrators of the worst
kinds of humanitarian atrocities go unpunished. After all, anecdotes
abound of indicted human rights abusers in the former Yugoslavia who are
at large and roam freely through the Serbian countryside. 7 1 But looks,
especially first glances, can be deceiving. To begin, these anecdotes do not
adequately capture the fates of potential perpetrators who were
incapacitated before they could do any significant harm to their victims.
The quick glance also does not capture the true risks and fates of those
perpetrators who do succeed in their quest to inflict atrocities. For every
Mladic who seems to escape any formal sanction, there are probably
dozens, if not hundreds, of other perpetrators of atrocities whose fates are
less fortunate. In other words, none of the existing anecdotes necessarily
support the presupposition that an underlying culture of impunity exists in
weak states. More importantly, to the extent that some perpetrators of
atrocities do evade punishment, it is not clear how one can evaluate claims
that ICTs will effectively address any shortcomings or gaps among
preexisting sanctions in weak states.
The economic model of crime deterrence offers one promising
framework for evaluating the deterrence effects of ICTs. As noted above,

69. SADAT, supra note 46, at 49.
70. See Kiss, supra note 41.
71. See, e.g., Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Address to the Security Council (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/
p917-e.htm (describing nearly twenty fugitives named in Security Council resolutions or ICTY
indictments who remained at large).
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the model suggests that deterrence of potential perpetrators will depend
upon the severity and certainty of punishment by ICTs, the individual risk
preferences of potential perpetrators, and the likelihood of other
preexisting sanctions.72 The "severity and certainty" factors support the
claims of scholars that ICT deterrence will only be improved by bolstering
ICT resources and increasing the frequency of ICT prosecutions. But any
attempt to apply the economic model of deterrence to ICTs must confront
the likelihood that preexisting informal and formal sanctions might render
negligible any additional deterrent effect of ICT prosecutions. In this Part,
we report on data gathered on a set of individuals who represent likely
targets of ICT prosecutions-coup plotters in Africa during the post
independence period. This data suggests that the strong likelihood that a
perpetrator of humanitarian atrocities will be subject to a range of severe
and certain preexisting sanctions significantly reduces any expected
deterrence effect of ICT prosecutions.
A. The Methodology
The relatively few ICT prosecutions and even fewer ICT trials make it
difficult to generalize about the certainty and severity of ICT punishment.
But the procedural and political constraints that ICTs face make it unlikely
that they will be the primary vehicles for the prosecution of humanitarian
atrocities. For instance, under the Rome Statute, the ICC can only
prosecute claims when the authorities in the affected state are unwilling or
unable to do SO. 73 Furthermore, since the ICC and the ad hoc ICTs lack
any independent enforcement power, they will also have to depend on the
goodwill of member states to hunt down and prosecute suspects.74 Finally,
the severity of ICT punishments will likely be constrained by the
prohibition of capital punishment in all ICT systems.7 5 While the small
sample of ICT prosecutions makes it difficult to generalize at this stage

72. See discussion in Part III.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 17(1)(a) (requiring ICC Prosecutor to deem inadmissible
any case "being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution").
74. See Goldsmith, supra note 9 (arguing that United States non-participation undermines ICT
enforcement).
75. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 77(l)(b) (allowing maximum penalty of life
imprisonment "when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime"); Statute of the Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, art. 24(1) (May 25, 1993) (amended Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.un.
org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf (penalties "limited to imprisonment"); Statute for
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 23 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at http://69.94.11.53/
ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (penalties limited to imprisonment).
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about the likely severity of future ICT sanctions, it is safe to assume that
forfeiture. 76

such sanctions will be limited to prison sentences or property
One aspect of the deterrence model, however, can be tested empirically
over a broad set of data. One can assess the deterrence effect of ICTs in
part by reviewing the likelihood that an ICT target would be subject to
alternative sanctions. Even if the certainty of ICT punishments is assumed
to be quite robust, the comparatively greater certainty of other preexisting
sanctions might undermine the deterrence effect of ICTs. Similarly, if the
severity of preexisting sanctions is likely to be greater than the severity of
ICT punishments, this too would reduce or eliminate any deterrence effect
of ICTs.
An empirical study which evaluates the likelihood and severity of
preexisting informal and formal sanctions could test the extent of this
substitution effect. Such a study would not resolve conclusively the
question of the certainty of ICT prosecutions, but it might make such a
determination unnecessary. Even if there is a significant probability of an
ICT prosecution for every category of humanitarian atrocities (a highly
unlikely and generous assumption), it might nonetheless be swamped by
the greater deterrence effect of preexisting formal and informal sanctions.
B. The Data: IsolatingLikely HumanitarianOffenders
The first task in assessing the deterrence effect of ICTs is to isolate the
group of individuals most likely to be prosecuted by ICTs. To do so, we
review data gathered on the fates of African coup participants for the
period 1955-2003. This information was collected in part from a data set
on coup events in Africa put together by Patrick McGowan. 77 McGowan's
data set covers all military coups d'etat, failed coups, and reported coup
plots for all independent African states from January 1956 through
December 2003. We built upon McGowan's database by assembling an
expanded data set that examines the fates of the coup participants in each
category of coup events. We gathered most of our information from a
variety of news sources, including the following: archives on the LexisNexis news service, descriptive data files from McGowan's event file,
online newspaper sources like the New York Times, and John Wiseman's
PoliticalLeaders in Black Africa: A BiographicalAfrican Dictionary of

76.
77.

See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 77(2) (allowing property forfeiture as penalty).
Patrick J. McGowan, Intervention Event File (2003) (on file with authors).

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:777

the Major Politicians Since Independence.78 Where multiple coup
participants were involved in a single event and were subject to different
fates, we coded the outcome by listing the most severe fate faced by any of
the coup participants. Where we were unable to verify an authoritative
news account of the fate of a coup participant, we simply listed the fate of
the coup participant as unknown.
Ideally, to examine the probability that African humanitarian offenders
are likely to face preexisting sanctions, we would want information on the
fates of participants in every civil war, insurrection, coup event, and
violent suppression of political opposition that has occurred in Africa
since independence of the various African states. Unfortunately, given the
complex and messy nature of most armed insurrections and violent
suppressions, a comprehensive account of such events does not exist. One
of the benefits of using the fates of African coup participants is that it
codes all known attempts to overthrow a regime in Africa, even if those
attempts ultimately failed. But the data are likely to omit a certain number
of potential humanitarian offenders, such as those African leaders who
attempt to use violence to suppress the political opposition of those
individuals whose ultimate ambition is not to overthrow or change the
regime in power. As many of those who seek to suppress political
resistance by brute force in Africa have come into power by means of a
coup d'etat, this omission should not bias the information presented here
in any significant way. That is, since the data gives an overall picture of
the fates of all African coup participants, it necessarily subsumes the fates
of those coup participants who subsequently attempted to suppress the
political opposition. But even if the pool of coup participants does not
overlap significantly with humanitarian offenders, we have no reason to
think that the fates faced by coup participants are going to be significantly
different from those faced by humanitarian offenders.
In any event, the data set we have assembled offers a rich source of
descriptive empirical evidence on preexisting sanctions likely to be faced
by ICT defendants. This is because a large proportion of ICT prosecutions
79
seek to punish individuals engaged in civil or intra-national conflict.
Indeed, all of the ad hoc U.N. ICTs have been set up to prosecute war
crimes occurring within a single state during a time of civil war. These
wars have inevitably been characterized by power struggles among rival

78. JOHN A. WISEMAN, POLITICAL LEADERS IN BLACK AFRICA: BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
MAJOR POLITICIANS SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1991).

79. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 808, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (Yugo.).
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groups seeking political power in weak states. Humanitarian atrocities,
especially those ordered by individuals at the highest level of government,
almost always occur in the context of a power struggle between ethnic
groups or rival factions. 80 More importantly, such atrocities almost always
occur in a8 1"weak state" that is unable or unwilling to prosecute such

offenders.
Coup events in Africa follow a similar fact pattern. African coups often
occur in weak states characterized by unstable political systems and
substantial internal ethnic conflict.82 Moreover, African coup plotters tend
to employ significant violence to achieve their political objectives. Once
they are successfully ensconced in power, the former coup plotters
themselves often become afraid of being removed by force and are likely
to employ oppressive measures to silence any real or imagined political
opponents.
Given Africa's propensity for coups d'etat and civil wars, 83 it is not
surprising then that all of the existing ICC cases are located in Africa
(Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and that two of
the United Nations' four ad hoc tribunals are set up to prosecute
humanitarian atrocities that have occurred in Africa (Rwanda and Sierra
Leone). In all of these cases, the humanitarian atrocities were ordered or
permitted by either incumbent officials seeking to put down a civil
rebellion or by rebels seeking to oust the existing government.84
African coup participants, including coup opponents, thus provide a
grim but potentially illustrative data set for exploring the incentives facing

80. The two ad hoc U.N. ICTs were set up to prosecute crimes in two such states: the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The wars in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda arose out of conflicts between
different religious and ethnic groups, as opposed to ideological or other divisions. See SCHARF,
BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 21-37; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A

GENOCIDE 229-30 (1995).
81. For instance, all states that have been subject to ICT prosecutions (Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Congo, Sudan, Cambodia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) rank in the top twenty of the "Failed States
Index" published by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. The index rates countries on
twelve factors including criminalization of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, and
widespread violation of human rights. See Foreign Policy & The Fund for Peace, The Failed State
Index, FOREIGN POLICY, May/June 2006, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?
storyid=3420.
82. See id.
83. Studies of conflict patterns across the world suggest that Africa is the region most prone to
civil conflict. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoefller, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J.
CONFLICT RES. 13, 13 (2002). Similarly, other studies show that Africa is the most coup-prone region
of the world. See Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Coups D'Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency,
Trends, and Distribution, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 339, 341 (2003).
84. See
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likely targets of future ICT prosecutions. For the foreseeable future, it is
likely that most ICT prosecutions, both of the ad hoc and permanent
variety, will involve defendants who sought to achieve political change or
consolidation through violent means in weak or failed states.
C. Findings
As noted above, to know whether ICT prosecutions will make a
difference we need to look at the likely fates of African coup participants
absent ICT intervention-a group that is likely to include targets of ICT
prosecutions. From such a look, it is not self-evident that ICT prosecutions
will make any difference.
Consider first the fates of those who venture into national politics in
Africa, not just those who seek to overthrow or change existing
governments through violence. As Wiseman observes, of the 485
individuals who became political leaders in Africa prior to 1991, an
astonishing 59.4% suffered unfortunate fates directly linked to their
political activities.
Indeed, of Wiseman's entire database of African
leaders, 17.7% were killed, and another 41.6% either suffered
imprisonment or exile or both. Put differently, more than one-half of all
African leaders since independence through 1991 have been killed,
imprisoned, or exiled.86 Thus, from a rationalist perspective it would seem
that only individuals with a taste for personal danger and high risk would
tend to seek political office in Africa.
Obviously, generalizations about the risks of seeking political office in
Africa are subject to some important qualifications. For instance, countries
as varied as South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Namibia
have all exhibited historically high levels of political stability and
economic growth and seem to be largely immune to the leadership risks
described above. But for most sub-Saharan African states, peaceful
transitions from political office appear to be the exception rather than the
87
norm. Indeed, most coups d'etat in the world today take place in Africa.
However, as Table 1 indicates, the outcomes of African coups d'etat are
subject to considerable variation across countries, and a significant
proportion of such coups end in failure.

85.
657, 659
86.
87.

John Wiseman, Leadership and PersonalDanger in African Politics, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
(1993).
Id. at 658-59.
See McGowan, supra note 83, at 341.
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TABLE 1: INCIDENCE OF VARIOUS AFRICAN COUP EVENTS,

1955-2003"s
Country

Total
Events

Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cent. Afr. Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Congo (DRC)
C6te d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Eq. Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sdo Tom6 &
Principe
Senegal
Seychelles

1
15
14
14
2
12
9
10
11
11
8
1
7
11
4
5
22
12
10
3
6
15
4
3
7
10
2
6
12
2
2

Failed Coups
(Proportions in
parentheses)
1(1.00)
3 (.20)
1 (.07)
7 (.50)
1 (.50)
5 (.42)
5 (.56)
6 (.60)
5 (.45)
1 (.09)
3 (.38)
1(1.00)
3 (.43)
2 (.18)
1 (.25)
2 (.40)
6 (.27)
2 (.17)
2 (.20)
1 (.33)
1 (.17)
3 (.20)
2 (.50)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
2 (.20)
1 (.50)
2 (.33)
2 (.17)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)

Coup Plots
(Proportions in
parentheses)
0 (.00)
6 (.40)
7 (.50)
2 (.14)
1 (.50)
3 (.25)
1 (.11)
1 (.10)
4 (.36)
7 (.64)
4 (.50)
0 (.00)
3 (.43)
5 (.45)
3 (.75)
1 (.20)
11 (.50)
9 (.75)
5 (.50)
2 (.67)
1 (.17)
11 (.73)
1 (.25)
3 (1.00)
5 (.71)
5 (.50)
1 (.50)
1 (.17)
4 (.33)
1 (.50)
1 (.50)

Successful Coups
(Proportions in
parentheses)
0 (.00)
6 (.40)
6 (.43)
5 (.36)
0 (.00)
4 (.33)
3 (.33)
3 (.30)
2 (.18)
3 (.27)
1 (.13)
0 (.00)
1 (.14)
4 (.36)
0 (.00)
2 (.40)
5 (.23)
1 (.08)
3 (.30)
0 (.00)
4 (.67)
1 (.07)
1 (.25)
0 (.00)
2 (.29)
3 (.30)
0 (.00)
3 (.50)
6 (.50)
1 (.50)
1 (.50)

1
1

1(1.00)
0 (.00)

0 (.00)
0(.00)

0 (.00)
1 (1.00)

88. Using McGowan's terminology, a successful coup refers to a forceful overthrow of a present
government; failed coups are such efforts that fail; coup plots are when the government announces that
it has discovered a conspiracy to overthrow the government. See id. at 339-44.
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Country

Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total

Total Failed Coups .
Events (Proportions in
parentheses)
7 (.41)
17
6
2 (.33)
0 (.00)
1
32
11 (.34)
3
1 (.33)
1 .(33)
3
6 (.55)
11
8 (.47)
17
4
3 (.75)
1 (1.00)
1
348
112 (.32)

Coup Plots
(Proportions in
parentheses)
5 (.29)
3 (.50)
1(1.00)
17 (.53)
1 (.33)
2 (.67)
3 (.27)
5 (.29)
1 (.25)
0 (.00)
147 (.42)

Successful Coups
(Proportions in
parentheses)
5 (.29)
1 (.17)
0 (.00)
4 (.13)
1 (.33)
0 (.00)
2 (.18)
4 (.24)
0 (.00)
0 (.00)
89 (.26)

A close look at the fates of these coup participants suggests that trying
to seek political change in Africa through violence is an extremely
dangerous activity. For instance, of all coup participants in Africa during
the relevant period, including those who were successful, 28% were
executed or otherwise murdered, 22% were exiled or imprisoned, and 16%
were arrested without any clear outcomes. Of course, failure often entails
even more dire consequences for coup participants. As Table 2 below
indicates, 35% of all individuals who engaged in failed coups were
executed or otherwise murdered, 27% were imprisoned or exiled, and 16%
were arrested without any clear outcomes. Similarly, 32% of all
individuals who engaged in coup plots were executed or otherwise
murdered, 27% were imprisoned or exiled, and 21% were arrested without
any clear outcomes.
TABLE 2: FATES OF AFRICAN COUP PARTICIPANTS, 1955-2003
Coup
Events

Total
Number
of
Actors
279

Failed
Coups
Coup Plots 370
Successful

Coups

136

Executed/ Imprisoned Exiled/ Arrested Fired/ No
Demoted Information
Tried in
Murdered/
Absentia
Died in
Prison
.08
.16
.02
.05
.35
.22
.32

.24

.03

.21

.05

.09

.01

0

0

0

0

0
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Coup

Executed/
Total
Number Murdered/

Events

All Coup
Events

of

Died in

Actors
785

Prison
.28

No
Imprisoned Exiled/ Arrested Fired/
Demoted Information
Tried in

Absentia
.19

.16

.03

.03

.07

If we isolate the most coup-prone countries in Africa, the fates of coup
participants are much worse. A breakdown of the data among those
African countries that have witnessed eleven or more coups d'etat, as in
Table 3, suggests that the probability that coup participants will be killed
or imprisoned is still significant in the African states most accustomed to
coups d'etat.
TABLE

3: FATES OF COUP PARTICIPANTS INTHE MOST COUP-PRONE

AFRICAN STATES (AFRICAN STATES WITH ELEVEN OR MORE

CouP

EVENTS,

1955-2003)
Imprisoned
Executed/
(All events)
Murdered/
Died in Prison
(All events)
.41
.08

Benin

Executed/
Murdered/
Died in Prison
(Failed Coups)
.17

Imprisoned
Imprisoned Executed/
(Coup Plots)
(Failed
Murdered/
Coups)
Died in Prison
(Coup Plots)
.71
.07
.17

Burkina Faso

.00

.00

.67

.07

.39

.04

Burundi

.05

.50

.75

.00

.13

.33

Cent. Afr. Rep.

.30

.30

.20

.00

.21

.16

Congo

.54

.23

.22

.22

.35

.19

Congo (DRC)

1.00

.00

.71

.18

.57

.13

Ethiopia

1.00

.00

.69

.00

.69

.00

Ghana

.31

.04

.37

.27

.29

.16

Guinea

.78

.11

.06

.06

.31

.08

Liberia

.22

.22

.39

.26

.35

.24

Nigeria

.67

.17

.73

.28

.50

.18

Sierra Leone

.44

.00

.00

.31

.17

.09

Sudan

.42

.00

.00

.32

.20

.14

Togo

.36

.00

.00

.00

.23

.00

Uganda

.30

.10

.72

.00

.38

.04

Total

.40

.13

.38

.22

.31

.15

Countries
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Note that this data understates to a significant degree the full risks
associated with participating in African coups d'etat. The data only
focuses on what happens to coup participants at the time they seek to
obtain power. But even after successfully obtaining power, African coup
participants are subject to a wide range of risks. Indeed, a considerable
number of successful African coup participants have been assassinated or
killed in coup plots after obtaining power, including: Aguiyi Ironsi and
Murtala Muhammed in Nigeria, Samuel Doe in Liberia, Macias Nguema
in Equatorial Guinea, and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso.89
Beyond the significant risks of death faced by African coup
participants, the dangers they face when imprisoned are likely to be
different from those faced by offenders subject to prosecution by ICTs. As
various human rights groups have documented, African prisons are
notoriously overcrowded, under-funded, and prone to significant riots and
outbreaks of disease. 90 Moreover, political prisoners in Africa are often
subject to a wide range of degrading and inhumane treatment-such as
torture, physical abuse, and public humiliation-treatment that one is
unlikely to encounter in prison facilities administered by ICTs. 91
More generally, political regimes in Africa are likely to have more
flexibility than ICTs in tailoring sanctions in response to disfavored
humanitarian offenses. ICTs are limited by their mandate to administering
prison sentences, which some economists have conjectured might be less
efficient in deterring crimes than certain forms of corporal punishment. 92
But African regimes, especially of the non-democratic variety, can elect to
use a mix of corporal and non-corporal sanctions to attain the optimal
amount of deterrence against potential humanitarian offenders. Of course,
as a normative matter, many alternative sanctions might be legally or
morally problematic. As a practical matter, however, such considerations
do not seem to constrain the choices of many African politicians.

89. See Wiseman, supra note 85, at 659.
90. See, e.g., Alex Last, The Notorious Jailsof Nigeria, BBC Africa News Service, Apr. 7, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4880592.stm; Human Rights Watch Prison Project,
Prisons in Africa, http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/prisons/africa.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
91. See Human Rights Watch Prison Project, supra note 90 (describing typical treatment of
political prisoners in Africa). For how ICT prisons treat prisoners, see Rome Statute, supra note 18,
art. 106 ("The enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the
Court and shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment
of prisoners."). For a discussion of the international system for incarcerating prisoners, see Dirk van
Zyl Smit, InternationalImprisonment, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 357, 357-58 (2005).
92. See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively
Costly Punishment, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 377 (2003).
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D. Implicationsfor the DeterrenceEffect of ICT Prosecutions
The data above reflects the extent to which a pool of likely perpetrators
of humanitarian atrocities face preexisting sanctions for their activities.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that such perpetrators operate in a
culture of impunity, we have shown that those in Africa routinely face
sanctions which are likely to be more severe and certain than any meted
out by any existing or future ICT. Indeed, more often than not, the
individuals who self-select into efforts to effect political change in Africa
are killed or imprisoned.
In other words, our study suggests that perpetrators of humanitarian
atrocities are going to be high-risk individuals who are not likely to be
significantly deterred by the prospect of further prosecution by ICTs.
Because coup participants in Africa, a representative sample of potential
humanitarian offenders, appear to discount significantly the risks that they
might get killed or tortured for their activities, they are also likely to
discount the risks of ICT prosecutions.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the fates of coup participants
improve when we focus on the most coup-prone African states. Indeed, the
data in Table 3 suggest the opposite-that the probability of death or
imprisonment tends to be higher in the more coup-prone African states.
One would expect that if coup participants were responsive to punitive
sanctions, there would be a drop-off in the number of coups planned in
those African states where the risks of death and imprisonment were
acutely high. Indeed, in the coup-prone Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), a country commonly singled out by human rights activists as
emblematic of a culture of impunity and one of the first states to be
targeted for atrocity investigations by the ICC, a staggering 57% of all
coup participants were executed and another 13% were imprisoned. If we
narrow the Congolese evidence to coup plots, then 71% of the participants
were executed; for failed coups, 100% of participants were executed.
The significance of these findings becomes more pronounced when we
compare them to domestically available data on the probability that one
would be caught and convicted for a serious violent crime. Take, for
instance, the data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) on clearance rates-the percentage of known
crimes for which there is an arrest and charge-and conviction rates for
violent crimes in the United States. The FBI data suggest that enforcement
authorities clear about 49% of all violent offenses, while the DOJ's data
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suggests that the conviction rate for such offenses is about 88%. 9 3 Thus, a
fair estimate of the probability that an individual will get caught and
convicted for a violent crime in the United States is about 43%. Of course,
since not all violent crimes are reported, this data probably
significantly
94
convicted.
and
caught
being
of
probability
the
overstates
There has been no comparable study of the probability of being caught
and punished by an ICT for committing a humanitarian atrocity. There is
little reason to believe, however, that ICTs will be able to achieve
anything close to the levels of punishment achieved domestically. 95 For
instance, the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has tried only
twenty-six individuals in its seven-year existence (at a cost of $1 billion)
and has only twenty-six trials underway. 96 Only twenty additional
individuals have been indicted, and the tribunal estimates that it may
complete sixty-five to seventy trials by the time its mandate expires in
2008. 9 7 Comparing this number of trials to the huge number of potential
offenders (in Rwanda, the government itself at one point claimed 130,000
offenders), 98 one surmises that the ICTR might eventually prosecute
approximately 0.005% of the pool of the likely humanitarian offenders in
the Rwandan civil war-a figure that makes it highly unlikely that the
ICTR will exert even a marginal deterrent effect on future humanitarian
offenders. 99
These numbers make it easier to assess whether adding a new range of
sanctions against African coup participants is likely to make any
meaningful difference. In many respects, the United States data on the
clearance and arrest rates for violent crimes paints a fairly pessimistic

93. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES 1998 (1998); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 402 (1998). The rate of prosecution for certain types of crimes may also be substantially
less. A 1988 statistical survey concluded that suspects were arrested in only three million of about
thirty-four million serious crimes in the United States in 1986. A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTrEE ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 4-5 (1988).

94. For instance, Levitt estimates that victims only report 38% of crimes committed, which
means that the conviction rates are probably not quite correct. See Levitt, supra note 47, at 369.
95. The Nuremberg Tribunal, for instance, is estimated to have prosecuted no more than 3.5% of
all suspected German war criminals. See Amann, supra note 29.
96. President of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Completion Strategy of
International Tribunalfor Rwanda, Letter of December 5, 2005, addressed to the President of the

Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/782 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
completionstrat/s-2005-782e.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Helena Cobban, InternationalCourts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 22, 26.
99. It is possible that all of this data suggests that deterrence is unlikely for even domestic
criminal law systems. For our purposes, however, it is enough to demonstrate that the likelihood of
deterrence is substantially less in the case of international criminal systems.
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picture of what we might expect of ICTs. Given that African coup
participants face comparably higher sanctions than violent criminals in the
United States, one might safely conjecture that the coup participants are
likely to engage in their activities no matter how large the expected ICT
sanction might be. Put differently, if it turns out that the expected benefit
of participating in coup activities or engaging in humanitarian atrocities is
high enough, we may safely conclude that African coup participants will
consider the risk factors outlined above and discount them.
Anecdotal evidence of contemporary indicted humanitarian offenders
supports the claim that the individuals who select into these kind of
activities are likely to be very difficult to deter. Take, for instance, the case
of Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia who has been labeled
one of the most egregious humanitarian offenders in recent memory.1 00
Taylor first gained notoriety when as a minister in the Liberian
government he stole funds from the regime of Samuel Doe-then one of
the most brutal despots in West Africa. He fled to the United States, was
arrested by the FBI, and then escaped American federal custody while
awaiting extradition. He then fled to the Libyan desert where he
commanded a crew of rebels who subsequently managed to force Doe out
of power in Liberia. Taylor's regime immediately became embroiled in a
massive civil war which lasted over seven years. In 2003, at the height of
the civil war and as rebel forces were encroaching upon the Liberian
capital, Taylor intervened simultaneously in two civil wars in neighboring
Sierra Leone and Guinea. 101 Indeed, his current indictment is for atrocities
he and his troops committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone.102
Regardless of what one thinks of Taylor as a moral agent, he was clearly
an individual who courted significant and dangerous risks in his political
life. In sum, he was a prime political opportunist who seemed nearly
undeterrable in his quest to amass rents from public office.
Of course, none of this data conclusively resolves the question of
whether humanitarian offenders in Africa or elsewhere will always be
difficult to deter. The lack of any hard evidence on how humanitarian

100. See, e.g., Donna Bryson, Case Strikes a Blow Against African Despotism, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 2, 2006, at A21 (describing Taylor as being "accused of greed and savagery

extraordinary even for a continent that has known some of the worst tyrants of modem times"); David
Wallechinsky, The World's Ten Worst Dictators, PARADE MAG., Feb. 16, 2003, available at
http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2003/edition_02-16-2003/Dictators.
101. For background on Liberia's civil war, see U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Liberia
(Sept. 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm.
102. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Amended Indictment (Mar. 17,
2006), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-0 1-l-75.pdf.
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offenders actually respond to ICT prosecutions suggests that our findings
should be treated with caution. First, the data we provide here is
descriptive and does not purport to show that coup participants or
humanitarian offenders will never respond to threats of ICT prosecution.
Second, our project does not purport to use any econometric methods that
might show the lack of correlation between ICT prosecutions and the
commission of humanitarian offenses. Thus, it remains possible that in the
future, scholars who have the benefit of a more detailed set of prosecution
data could demonstrate a robust link between ICT prosecutions and
deterrence.
Finally, our analysis is limited in that the data here focuses more
generally on the risks to individuals trying to achieve political change in
Africa by force of arms, rather than on the more specific risks faced by
individuals engaging in humanitarian atrocities. To be sure, many coup
events that take place in Africa are not necessarily accompanied by efforts
by the coup participants to commit atrocities. But it seems that the risks
faced by those individuals who try to achieve political change or maintain
political power by force will necessarily subsume the risks faced by many
of those individuals who attempt to attain similar objectives by
committing large scale humanitarian atrocities. The overlap in the data
will not, of course, be perfect because there will be those who commit
atrocities without seeking to overthrow the existing political regime.
Nonetheless, given the inherent limitations in trying to select a subset of
likely humanitarian offenders that is divorced from objective accounts of
efforts to overthrow governments, we believe that coup participants
represent a second-best proxy for likely humanitarian offenders.
Moreover, there is no strong theoretical reason to assume a priori that
humanitarian offenders in Africa are going to face systematically lower
sanction risks than coup participants.
With these caveats in mind, it is worth noting that the evidence we
have gathered so far is in considerable tension with the supposition of ICT
proponents that there is an underlying culture of impunity within which
humanitarian offenders act. In the decades since most African states
became independent, coups and civil wars have multiplied, resulting in
fairly severe consequences for a majority of the participants. If we
acknowledge the severity and certainty of the range of sanctions faced by
these participants, then the deterrent effects of further prosecutions by
ICTs are likely to be insignificant. Moreover, because of the selection bias
in the data-the probable underreporting of the dismal fates of coup
participants because of the exclusion from the data of what subsequently
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happened to successful coup plotters-it is likely that the preexisting
sanctions are even more severe than the data we have presented indicates.
V. OPPORTUNITIES VERSUS WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT ATROCITIES

Given that the expected level of sanctions associated with committing
atrocities is high, why is there a relative concentration of humanitarian
atrocities in weak states, especially in Africa? After all, the economic
model of deterrence suggests that informal and formal sanctions ought to
deter potential coup participants or warlords from engaging in
humanitarian atrocities. We do not attempt to offer a definitive answer to
this question, although we offer one possible explanation based on the
distinction between the willingness and the opportunity to commit
atrocities. Individuals in mature states tend to commit fewer atrocities than
individuals in weak states, but not because they fear formal sanctions.
Rather, fewer atrocities are committed because there are fewer occasions
for individuals in mature states to do so.
According to this view, the ability of more mature states to withstand
significant outbreaks of humanitarian atrocities rests largely on the
presence of strong institutions that provide law and order, a free and
effective press, and political participation. 103 As political scientists have
argued, stable institutions in mature democracies usually ensure that
political leaders will be accountable to their domestic constituencies; in
turn, such accountability makes war between such regimes' 0 4 and coup
plots within such regimes 10 5 less likely. These same institutional features
may also make acts of humanitarian atrocities less likely in mature
states. 106 Indeed, the presence of a robust civil society and civil institutions

103. Admittedly, the last two factors are probably more characteristic of mature democracies than
of mature states generally. But with the possible exception of China, mature democracies define most
of the strongest states in existence today.
104. See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1995); Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita, An InstitutionalExplanation of the DemocraticPeace, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 791 (1999).
105. D.A. HIBBS, MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS NATIONAL ANALYSIS 102 (1973)
("Weakly institutionalized societies ... are far more likely than those with highly developed
institutions to suffer ... political interventions by the military.").
106. Take, for instance, the logic of suicide terrorism in more mature states. All else being equal, a
suicide terrorist might prefer to inflict the greatest number of casualties on citizens when he selects a
target. What prevents the suicide terrorist from realizing his goal is obviously not deterrence, but the
fact that he lacks the opportunity to carry out his criminal enterprise on such a grand scale. He might
be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice and give his life, but he might often find his efforts thwarted
by the existence of a sophisticated security apparatus. In other words, because the military and
enforcement capacities in mature states completely dwarf the resources of most prospective
entrepreneurs of mass violence, it is less likely that such entrepreneurs will ever be able to carry out
their enterprise to fruition. In his excellent study of the strategy of suicide terrorists, Pape argues that
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increases the chance that citizens will resist even minor attempts to
mobilize groups that will engage in humanitarian atrocities. 107
By contrast, weak and unstable states-in which most contemporary
humanitarian atrocities take place-often lack the basic institutional
structures needed to facilitate the rule of law and governmental control. As
various political scientists have pointed out, regimes in weak states tend to
suffer from widespread corruption, lack the ability to guarantee law and
order throughout their territory, and usually cannot fulfill their
international obligations.108 Even when they do attempt to exert their
authority, regimes in weak states are often prone to doing so in an
incompetent, arbitrary, and officious manner; thus, political scientists have
taken to labeling such states "weak leviathans."' 10 9 Finally, the militaries or
security forces in weak states are often plagued by organizational
ineffectiveness, corruption, and lack of resources. '1 0
Significantly, the inability of militaries or police forces in many weak
states to guarantee basic security means that such states are often
susceptible to violent attacks from fringe or disgruntled elements. For
instance, in Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, the failure of
successive regimes to manage their territories has spawned a series of
" ' Although many of these rebel
rebellions in those states.11
groups are
disorganized and lack many of the characteristics of a modem fighting

the best way to constrain suicide terrorists is to "reduce [their] confidence in their ability to carry out
such attacks on the target society." Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 343, 344 (2003). Of course, Pape's recommendations assume that the relevant society
would have both the resources and political might to influence the terrorist's confidence.
107. See HIBBS, supra note 105.
108.

See ROBERT JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE

THIRD WORLD (1990); Jeffrey Herbst, Responding to State Failure in Africa, 21 INT'L SEC., Winter
1996-1997, at 120, 120.
109. See Jeffery Herbst, War and the State in Africa 14 INT'L SEC. 117, 125 (1990) (citing
Thomas M. Callaghy, The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical,Historical,
and Comparative Reflections, in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 82

(Donald Rothchild & Naomi Chazan eds., 1988)).
110. As Decalo has written, "[M]any African militaries bear little resemblance to a modem
complex organizational model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist
allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of
corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances." SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA:
STUDIES IN MILITARY STYLE 14-15 (1976).
111. For some general background on these countries' difficulties, see The CIA World Factbook
entries. Chad, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cd.html
(describing flawed
constitutional elections and subsequent rebellion); Liberia, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/li.html (describing fourteen years of intermittent fighting following fall of Samuel
Doe's government in 1990); Sierra Leone, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html
(describing civil war lasting from 1991 to 2002); Sudan, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/su.html (describing civil war lasting from 1983 to present).
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force, African military forces have often proven incapable of constraining
them. As Herbst has observed, "[V]ery few African armies have won
outright victories against rebels or have been able to change the military
facts on the ground so that insurgents have to sue for peace."' 2
The shortcomings of African militaries imply that whole communities
are routinely subject to the arbitrary whims of military-type groups that
have displaced the state's authority in a region. Once these groups have
consolidated their power, they usually seek to strip the communities under
their control of any remnants of central state authority, such as the power
to tax or enforce order. In Africa, the most vicious of these groups usually
take the form of warlord armies or criminal syndicates; the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) in Uganda are notorious examples."13 Regardless of their
objectives, these groups tend to deploy brutal tactics to sanction detractors
or to consolidate power. For instance, the LRA has often used mutilation,
child abduction, and sex slavery to create a climate of fear and
intimidation among the Acholi communities of northern Uganda."14 As
Vinci has observed, the fear factor has served the LRA well by enabling a
relatively tiny group that lacks any modem5 military equipment to hold a
sixty-thousand-man Ugandan army at bay. "1
Beyond weak militaries, African states often lack the robust civil
society structures that help regimes constructively channel dissent and
political demands. As Huntington has suggested, when rising public
expectations in a weak state surpass the ability of political institutions to
manage such expectations, the end result is usually the kind of chaotic
political environment that is ripe for coup plots and civil unrest." 6 In this
kind of setting, citizens are less able to resist violent attempts by
insurgents and other groups to undermine the state's authority. More
significantly, the state itself may decide to shortchange its citizens and
engage in the same kind of predatory activity associated with the rebel
groups. For instance, military forces from Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and

112. Jeffrey Herbst, African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and
Combat Effectiveness, 41 J. PEACE RES. 357, 358 (2004).
113. For some background discussion on the rise of the warlord-led Revolutionary United Front
group in Sierra Leone, see Jeremy 1. Levitt, Illegal Peace? An Inquiry Into Power-Sharing with
Warlords and Rebels in Africa, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 495, 511-14 (2006). For a briefer discussion of
the rise of the Lord's Resistance Army and its classification as a warlord group, see Anthony Vinci,
The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord's Resistance Army, 16 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 360,

363 (2005).
114. See Vinci, supranote 113, at 370.
115. Seeid.at374.
116. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968).
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Uganda all attempted to take over the lucrative trade in diamonds, gold,
and copper during the Congolese civil war." 7 Similarly, Charles Taylor's
regime in Liberia systematically plundered that country's diamond
8
resources as well as the natural resources of neighboring Sierra Leone. "
These structural conditions allowing for atrocities are often nonexistent or trivial in more mature states. Thus, in judging whether a
strategy for reducing humanitarian atrocities might work, it is important to
understand whether the domestic institutional environment makes
atrocities more likely in the first place. If the institutional ability to
incapacitate humanitarian abusers varies across countries, then we would
expect the level of atrocities to depend on country-specific institutional
arrangements unrelated to the willingness of individual perpetrators to
commit atrocities.
Thus, even though the evidence on the fates of African coup plotters in
Part III suggests strongly that acquiring political power by force in Africa
is fraught with significant risks, a majority of the coup plots and civil wars
in the world today still take place in Africa. 119 The reason for this apparent
paradox is that fragile domestic institutions tend to make the environment
ripe for humanitarian atrocities regardless of the motivations of the
perpetrators. In other words, rather than attributing to weak African states
a culture of impunity where perpetrators of atrocities go unpunished, it is
more likely that these states possess an enabling environment where
atrocities can easily be committed regardless of whether the perpetrators
are punished or fear punishment. It should therefore come as no surprise
that the worst humanitarian atrocities in Africa usually occur in the most
fragile and vulnerable states on the continent-Sierra
Leone, Sudan,
20
Congo, Central African Republic, and Liberia. 1
Our theoretical framework does not suggest that all states that lack
strong civil or military institutions will be equally prone to humanitarian
atrocities. Regimes in weak states that have successfully consolidated their
authority by co-opting their political opponents and significant sections of
civil society may be less prone to humanitarian atrocities than regimes that
117. See Seth A. Malamut, A Band-aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley
Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 29 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 25, 29-30 (2005) (describing role of diamonds and other natural resources in
civil wars involving Congo).
118. See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations,
and the UniversalityDebate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 12 (2003) (describing diamonds as target
of rebels during Sierra Leone civil war).
119. See McGowan, supra note 83, at 341.
120. See Foreign Policy & The Fund for Peace, supra note 81, at 50.
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have failed to do so. For instance, this is likely the case in C6te d'Ivoire
under the regime of F6lix Houphouet-Boigny. Although C6te d'Ivoire was
always a weak state, Houphout was able to use a combination of
extensive patronage networks, a forced one-party system, and a sheer cult
of personality to create a relatively stable regime that lasted over thirty
years. 121 Upon his death, however, the state's institutional vulnerabilities
were exposed, and CMte d'Ivoire quickly descended into a bitter and
tumultuous civil war. 122 Thus, it is possible in weak states for a strong and
autocratic regime to adopt leadership strategies that make less likely the
kinds of political crisis that lead to humanitarian atrocities. In Table 4
below, we classify states into categories according to the risks of their
being subject to humanitarian atrocities. According to our hypothesis, we
would expect most humanitarian atrocities to occur in states in the lower
left quadrant. States in the upper quadrants-most advanced
democracies-will have very little reason to adopt domestic enforcement
strategies to counter humanitarian atrocities because the institutional
conditions that make such atrocities likely will probably be nonexistent.
TABLE 4
RISK THAT STATES WILL BE PRONE TO HUMANITARIAN ATROCITIES

Degree of
Atrocities
Risk
Minimal

Efforts to Avoid Atrocities
Minimal
Significantly High
Humanitarian atrocities are No governments should be
almost non-existent because found in this category.
of strong institutions,
Given the presence of
political transparency, and strong institutions, there is
political accountability,
no need to adopt strategies
Example: most
that reduce the kind of
industrialized western
intense political crisis that
democracies,

would lead to atrocities.

121. Howard W. French, Les Faux Complots d'Houphoult-Boigny[The Fake Plots of HouphoutBoigny], FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1999, 114, 115-19.
122.

Id.
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Atrocities are very likely
because of the lack of
strong institutions and
political accountability,
Moreover, governments are
not adopting strategies that
make political crisis
unlikely,

Atrocities are relatively
rare. Although states in
this category lack strong
institutions, they have
adopted regime-specific
strategies like patronage or
rent-dispensation networks
that make political crisis

Examples: C6te d'Ivoire
after Houphoudt-Boigny,
Congo (DRC) since
independence, Liberia
under Doe and Taylor.

unlikely.
Example: C6te d'Ivoire
under Houphouet-Boigny.

The current deterrence-based justifications for ICTs, however, mostly
ignore this distinction between the opportunity and the willingness to
commit atrocities. But if there is no significant difference between the
willingness factor in mature and weak states, then it makes much more
sense to focus on incapacitation rather than the type of deterrence
strategies favored by ICT proponents. At this stage, we have insufficient
information regarding the relative weight of these factors. But the
preliminary evidence does suggest that each state's institutional capacity
circumscribes the choices available to potential perpetrators of human
rights atrocities.
VI. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ICT PROSECUTIONS

Even though some academic commentators have expressed
reservations about the deterrent effect of ICTs, they are usually willing to
accord to ICTs other positive spillover effects, such as transmitting norms
of justice, promoting reconciliation between warring groups, and giving
victims the opportunity to tell their stories. 123 We do not contest the

123. For instance, Theodor Meron suggests that the hopes of ICT proponents are not only
deterrence, but also that "the individualization and decollectivization of guilt . . . would help bring
about peace and reconciliation." Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes: Lesson from the
Balkans, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 6 (1997). While acknowledging that the direct deterrence value of ICTs

is debatable, some proponents of ICTs nonetheless argue that the ICTs' role in the development of a
jurisprudence of the laws of war may have a deterrent effect on future perpetrators of atrocities. See
Allison Danner & Jenny Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of InternationalCriminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 148 (2005)

("There is more hope, however, that the well-established law of war, which is enforced through
international as well as domestic mechanisms, may, in fact, restrain professional militaries from
engaging in (or tacitly condoning) large-scale war crimes.").
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possibility that ICTs can have beneficial effects other than deterrence,
although we do believe that no causal relationship between ICT
prosecutions and these other beneficial effects has been demonstrated. For
instance, despite the fact that the ICTY has been in existence for over ten
years, it has yet to win significant acceptance among Serbs who largely
view it as playing a politically biased role in the Balkan disputes. 124
On the other hand, causal logic and some contrary empirical evidence
suggest that ICTs may sometimes exacerbate humanitarian atrocities. 125
Indeed, we argue that on balance, ICT prosecutions in the context of
ongoing military disputes in weak states are likely to be counterproductive
because any marginal deterrent benefits of such prosecutions are likely to
be outweighed by their exacerbating effects. We focus on two factors that
might cause ICTs to deepen cleavages in weak states: the prosecution of
politically indispensable individuals and political opportunism effects.
A. The Prosecutionof PoliticallyIndispensableIndividuals
In discourse about how to resolve humanitarian atrocities, international
lawyers and political proponents of ICTs often elevate the primacy of legal
over political solutions. 126 As E.H. Carr once noted, this legalist impulse is
partly motivated by the belief that by "establish[ing] the rule of law.., we
shall transfer our differences from the turbulent political atmosphere of
self-interest to the purer, serener air of impartial justice." 127 But there are a
number of reasons to believe that in the context of weak states facing
intense internal turmoil, prosecuting high-profile figures may actually

124. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi6 & John Hagan, The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of
Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)justice, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV.

369, 380-88 (2006) (observing declining support for the ICTY by Serbian survey-respondents who
increasingly believe that international judges on the ICTY are politically biased); Alissa J. Rubin &
Zoran Cirjakovic, Milosevic's Death Kindles Old Tensions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at All ("The
combination of Milosevic's death, which many Serbs believe was caused by the tribunal, either
through neglect or murder, and a sense that the tribunal treated Serbs unjustly, will make it more
difficult for the Serbian government to transfer Mladic to The Hague.").
125. For a brief and more general discussion of the unintended consequences of using
international courts to enforce compliance, see Karen Alter, Do International Courts Enhance
Compliance with InternationalLaw?, 25 REV. ASIAN & PAC. STUD. 51, 73 (2004); see also Lawrence
Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth

Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).
126. Norms of international accountability are an offshoot of global liberalism, which, as some
commentators have pointed out, is evident in the growing legalization of international relations. See

Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hardand Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG.
421 (2001).
127. E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 170 (1946).

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:777

deepen a humanitarian crisis by making political settlements more
difficult. More specifically, to the extent that ICT prosecutions or
indictments take place before military conflicts in weak states are
decisively resolved, they are more likely to derail or hinder successful
peace mediations.
One key distinction between weak and mature states underscores some
of the unintended consequences of ICT prosecutions. In stable, wellestablished political systems, enforcement agencies can target and
prosecute politically well-connected individuals with relatively little fear
of facing reprisals or undermining state institutions. In weak states on the
brink of collapse, however, viable institutions are often a luxury and wellconnected individual political players tend to become crucial players in
efforts to consolidate authority and reestablish political stability.12 8
Moreover, when weak states are embroiled in massive civil wars,
belligerents or state actors who are participating in humanitarian atrocities
are less likely to have an incentive to sue for peace if they know they will
be subject to subsequent prosecution for their activities. Of course, one
could argue that such actors might have an incentive to avoid engaging in
humanitarian atrocities in the first place if they know they are likely to
face subsequent international prosecution. But such an outcome is unlikely
for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, these potential humanitarian
offenders are already subject to a range of more severe preexisting
sanctions that they seem to discount significantly. Second, the positive
payoff of committing humanitarian atrocities might be significant enough
to a rational offender that he will have very little incentive to factor in the
remote possibility of an international prosecution.
In any event, scholars of comparative politics largely agree that
bargains among political elites-including oppositional belligerents-are
critical to consolidating democratic transitions and fostering institution
building in weak states. As Przeworski argues, "If a peaceful transition is
to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize
uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse
the process."' 129 Throughout Latin America, Europe, and Africa, such elite
pacts have proven successful in diffusing the resistance of prior

128. See Stephen J. Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT'L SEC. 5, 5 (1997)
(defining spoilers as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens
their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it").
129. Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITIONS
FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 60 (Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe C.
Schmitter, & Laurence Whitehead eds., 1986).
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authoritarian regimes to reform and preventing large-scale political
upheaval. 30 For instance, elite pacts proved crucial in brokering transition
arrangements in South Africa, Chile, and Argentina.
In South Africa, the pact expressly included an interim provision that
allowed the second-place party (the apartheid-era Nationalist Party) to
nominate the deputy president.' 3' The pact also set up a program for
former leaders of the apartheid regime who might have been complicit in
committing racial atrocities to apply for amnesty.' 32 To the leaders of the
African National Congress, the choice to forego prosecutions against the
former leaders of apartheid was considered critical for a peaceful and
workable transition. As Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President of South
Africa, observed, "Had there been a threat of a Nuremberg-style trial over
members of the apartheid security establishment we would have never
undergone peaceful change." 133
By targeting well-connected political individuals in weak states who
have allegedly committed atrocities, ICT prosecutions are likely to
undermine constructive political bargains for peace or even make such
bargains unlikely in the first place. Indeed, to date, almost all the current
efforts by the ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes risk
destabilizing ongoing peace processes or undermining preexisting political
bargains that granted amnesties to alleged war criminals. For instance, two
of the inaugural investigations undertaken by the ICC in Uganda and
Congo have been met with widespread criticism and condemnation from
key participants in ongoing peace mediations.
1. Uganda
At first blush, the almost twenty-year-old Ugandan civil war looked
like an ideal test case for the ICC. Since 1986, Joseph Kony and his Lord
Resistance Army (LRA) had engaged in a quixotic and messianic quest to

130. For a broad discussion of elite pacts during transitions, see Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of
Democratization in Latin America, 23 COMP. POL. 9 (1990); Alfred Stepan, Paths toward
Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations, in TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE, supra note 129, at 64.
131. See Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in
American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 1960-61

(1996) (describing provision of the interim constitution which allowed any party receiving more than
twenty percent of the vote to name a deputy president, enabling F.W. de Klerk to retain an important
position in the government).
132. See Kiss, supra note 41, at 77.
133. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH V.
JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 143.
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gain control of northern Uganda through a series of well-publicized rapes,
child abductions, mutilations, and mass murders. Kony, who has claimed
that he is on a biblical mission from God to take over Uganda, has been
blamed for the forced abduction of more than 30,000 children. In 1994,
Betty Bigombe-then a cabinet minister in the Ugandan governmentinitiated a peace process with an eye toward bringing both the key LRA
leaders and the Ugandan government to the table. A vital component of
the process was a broad-based amnesty program for LRA leaders that the
Ugandan government had passed into law in 2000.134 By summer 2005,
over 15,000 former combatants, including thousands of LRA rebels, had
taken advantage of the amnesty program.135 Although there was some
significant progress in the negotiations, especially in the late 1990s,
sporadic fighting between the Ugandan government and the LRA
continued. In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni decided to
refer the LRA case to the newly established ICC; in July 2004, Luis
Moreno Ocampo-the lead ICC prosecutor-announced he was starting
his investigation into the conflict.
Despite some initial praise of the ICC's investigations by international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Bigombe-the lead peace
negotiator in the conflict-and most of the local groups participating in the
negotiations in northern Uganda have been unambiguous in condemning
the ICC for jeopardizing the peace process. 136 Of particular concern to
Bigombe were the warrants that the ICC had been threatening to issue
137
since 2004 for the arrest of Kony and four other leaders of the LRA.
Just before the warrants were finally issued in the fall of 2005, Bigombe
had managed to achieve some key breakthroughs in the negotiations and
had sought to obtain explicit offers of amnesty from the Ugandan
government for Kony and other key LRA leaders. These amnesty offers
were no longer options after the ICC issued its warrants. For Bigombe, the
ICC's decision to issue the warrants imperiled the chances of any further
peaceful negotiations with the LRA.

134. See Amnesty Act, 2000 (Uganda), available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northemuganda/documents/2000 Jan The AmnestyAct.doc. The Amnesty Act targets "any Ugandan who
h
has at any time since the 26 day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion
against the Republic of Uganda." Id. § 3(1).
135. See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Accountability of Non-State Actors in Ugandafor War Crimes and
Human Rights Violations: Between Amnesty and the InternationalCriminal Court, 10 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 405, 421 (2005).

136. See Reuters, Uganda Aide Criticizes Court over Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at
Section 1; see also Bamuturaki Musinguzi, Amnesty Group Rejects ICC Trial of Kony Rebels, THE
EAST AFRICAN (Nairobi), Feb. 16, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 7085420.
137. See Musinguzi, supra note 136.
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In addition to Bigombe, almost all the important northern Ugandan
groups involved in the peace process have been critical of the ICC's role.
For instance, Bryan Higgs, Ugandan Program Development Officer for
Conciliation, has argued that the ICC "committed a terrible blunder" by
initiating a process that promises "in the end [that] neither justice nor
peace will be delivered." 138 Bishop Ochola, the vice chair of the Acholi
Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)-the most prominent NGO
representing LRA victims-told a journalist, "This kind of approach will
destroy all efforts for peace ...If we follow the ICC in branding LRA
criminals, [this war] won't stop.' 139 Father Rodriguez-another prominent

leader of the ARLPI-was even more direct in his criticism: "The issuing
of... international arrest warrants would practically close once and for all
the path to peaceful negotiation as a means to end this long war ....140
Even key foreign participants in the peace process, such as Bishop Tutu of
South Africa and Britain's U.N. Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, have
acknowledged that the ICC's role in Uganda has probably worsened the
prospects for any peaceful resolution to the nearly twenty-year conflict. 141
The problematic role of the ICC was highlighted by President
Museveni's dramatic peace offer to Kony and the LRA in the spring of
2006. Although Museveni promised a peace deal if Kony and the LRA
agreed to disarm by July, the ICC initially demanded that the Ugandan
government turn Kony over to the ICC consistent with its ICC
commitments. 142 This impasse prompted Kony to insist that the ICC drop
its charges against him and other LRA leaders as a condition for any future
peace negotiations. 143 Indeed, he initially refused to personally attend any
peace talks, probably due to fear of being arrested. Under persistent
pressure from the Ugandan government, the ICC apparently agreed to
rescind the arrest warrants against the LRA leaders. 144 Ostensibly, the
Ugandan government concluded that since the ICC lacked the military or

138. Id.
139. See Adam Branch, InternationalJustice, Local Injustice: The InternationalCriminal Court

in Northern Uganda,DISSENT, Summer 2004, at 22, 24.
140. See id.
141. See Josephine Volqvartz, ICC Under Fire over Uganda Probe, CNN, Feb. 23, 2005,
available at hftp://www.globalpoliey.org/intljustice/icc/2005/0223iccfire.htm.
142. See Uganda 'Must Arrest' LRA Leader, BBC News, May 18, 2006, available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/world/africa/4992896.stm.
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MONITOR, May 25, 2006, available at http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/8412/year-2006/document_
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144. See Charles Kazooba & Jumah Senyonga, ICC Willing to Lift Kony Indictment, Says
Uganda, THE NEW TIMES (Kigali), Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/
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enforcement resources to back up its arrest warrants, it was futile for the
government to rely on an ICC prosecution as a political strategy for
subduing the LRA. As one high-level Ugandan official bluntly put it: "We
approached an international peace keeping force to arrest Kony and his
commanders but they said it was not their concern and did not have the
mandate. . . .That is why we decided to opt for peace talks with the
LRA."' 14 5 In any event, the LRA leaders eventually agreed to a unilateral
ceasefire, presumably with the understanding that they would be granted
immunity from prosecution. 146 Whether or not the ceasefire will
eventually lead to a comprehensive peace agreement in this longstanding
conflict remains to be seen.147 Nonetheless, the Ugandan government
seems to have concluded that the initial decision to seek an ICC referral
did not increase the government's chance of a military victory over the
LRA, but instead made the prospects of a successful peace settlement less
likely.
2. Congo
A similar scenario has played out with the ICC efforts to intervene in
the civil war in Congo. 148 After Laurent Kabila deposed the dictator
Mobustu Sese-Seko in 1997, Congo descended into a brutal and costly
civil war in which 3.8 million people died, and in which almost the same
number of people were displaced from their homes. In January 2001,
Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph-a thirtytwo-year-old soldier with hardly any political experience. In late 2002,
South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to broker a peace
agreement in Pretoria that detailed the terms of a transitional government
and established a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Under the terms of
the agreement, Joseph Kabila would be the president but would share
authority with four vice presidents from the major rebel groups. Moreover,
the peace agreement brought an end to the foreign intervention in the
conflict by Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Angola. The agreement did

145.

See id.

146. See Reuters, World Briefing Africa: Uganda: Rebels Declare A Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2006, at A2.
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not end all hostilities, however, and in April 2004 Kabila sought a referral
to the ICC. Although the investigation by the ICC into the Congolese civil
war has not proceeded as far as in the Ugandan case, there are some
concerns that the ongoing investigation may undermine the fragile peace
of the 2002 agreement. In particular, since any subsequent warrants are
likely to target the rebel leaders who are now members of the coalitional
government, these leaders may now have very few incentives to keep up
their end of the bargain. 49 Indeed, some observers believe that one of
Kabila's motivations for seeking the ICC referral was to neutralize his
chief political rivals; his rivals happen to be those most likely to be targets
of any ICC investigation.' 50 Consequently, the ICC's current investigation
risks undermining the fragile peace agreement that has kept the coalitional
government together. Louis Michel, the foreign minister of Belgium and
one of the key participants in the peace process, has actually expressed
concern that the ICC's investigation could "run[] the risk of causing the
[peace] process to implode."' 5 '
3. Sierra Leone and Liberia
Efforts by other ICTs to prosecute or indict political "spoilers" have
also provoked backlash or warnings from peace mediators in other
conflicts. For instance, the Special Court for Sierra Leone-a mixed
tribunal established by the United Nations and the Sierra Leone
government-issued an indictment in March 2003 to arrest Charles
Taylor, the then dictator of Liberia, for his role in humanitarian atrocities
committed during the Sierra Leone civil war. Instead of being arrested,
however, Taylor voluntarily resigned in August 2003 and gave himself up
to Nigerian troops in exchange for amnesty and exile to Nigeria. Despite
calls by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for Nigeria to surrender Taylor,
and pressure from the United States, Nigeria pointedly refused to hand
over Taylor.

149. See id. at 565 ("Kabila is unlikely to be the subject of any ICC investigation, yet two of his
potential electoral opponents-Vice Presidents Jean Pierre Bemba of the MLC and Azarias Ruberwa
of the RCD-are among those most likely to be the subject of any early investigation.").
150. See id. ("Kabila's chief political rivals . . . could well find themselves the targets of
international investigations, in turn strengthening Kabila's political hand in the transitional
government and forthcoming elections.").
151.
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The Nigerian government's success in pressuring Taylor to resign and
accept asylum underscores the weakness of international tribunals when
dealing with contemporary conflicts that involve uneven distributions of
political power. At the time the Sierra Leone tribunal originally issued its
indictments, Taylor was the Liberian head of state and still commanded
substantial allegiance from Liberian government troops and paramilitary
units throughout the country. If the Nigerian government had not granted
Taylor asylum, he would have likely remained in power and exacerbated
the humanitarian crisis in both Liberia and the Sierra Leone. Moreover,
even if the West African troops could have forced Taylor out of power
involuntarily, the whole process to remove him could have resulted in
significantly more casualties as Taylor would have had every incentive to
fight to the end. By contrast, the special tribunal had no power to enforce
its arrest warrant against Taylor, nor did any of the tribunal's sponsorsthe United Nations or Sierra Leone-appear willing or able to apprehend
him by force. But for the West African governments whose troops bore a
significant brunt of the casualties in the Liberian civil war, ending the
conflict peacefully was the primary priority. In this respect, the tribunal's
narrow focus on justice against perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities
seemed misplaced to the West African mediators. When the indictment by
the tribunal was originally announced, the Organization of West African
States proclaimed that the special tribunal's actions had "put a damper on
the negotiations" at52the stage when Taylor seemed most amenable to
ending the conflict. 1
The Nigerian government eventually agreed to hand Taylor over to the
newly elected Liberian government; however, it refused to hand Taylor
over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. But even after a widely
acclaimed and peaceful election process in late 2005, the newly elected
Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf announced that prosecuting
Taylor was not a priority for her administration and that she had no
interest in asking Nigeria to end his asylum. 153 Like the ICC's role in the
Ugandan civil war, the irony of the special tribunal's quest to prosecute
Taylor is that two of the groups that were probably most victimized by
Taylor's brutal reign-Liberian citizens and West African peacekeepershave both expressed an interest in not pursuing justice. Later, under
pressure from the United States, Johnson-Sirleaf reluctantly agreed to

152. See Virginie Ladisch, Liberian President Indicted for War Crimes, CRIMES OF WAR
PROJECT, June 16, 2003, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-liberian.html.
153. See Taylor 'Not Priority'forLiberia, BBC News Service, Jan. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4655186.stm.
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request Taylor's surrender. Nigeria complied, but Johnson-Sirleaf's
reluctance to prosecute Taylor was so great that Taylor was immediately
transferred to a helicopter
that flew him to the custody of the Special Court
54
for Sierra Leone.

1

In yet another interesting twist to this ongoing saga, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone recently decided that it could no longer afford to try
Taylor for war crimes because the spectacle of a trial could undermine the
fragile peace agreement that ended the Sierra Leone civil war. 155 The
Dutch government has since agreed to host Taylor's formal trial at a
special ICC courtroom at the Hague, but only if another country commits
to hosting Taylor's prison term if he eventually gets convicted.' 56
The Liberian experience illustrates that in the wake of transitions from
harsh non-democratic regimes, the political clout of former political actors
may constrain the choices of the new government. But that constraint is
not insurmountable; if the government feels strong and secure enough, it
may decide to expend its political capital and prosecute members of the
old guard. In other circumstances, however, the government may wisely
conclude that arresting and prosecuting spoilers is likely to undermine the
transition process. Beyond the domestic government's decision to avoid
prosecution, outside mediators or intervenors like Nigeria also have to take
into account the tradeoffs that may exist between peace and justice in the
transition process. Since the Nigerian government promised to give Taylor
asylum in exchange for immunity, it was bound-on grounds of political
prudence-to keep its agreement. Had the Nigerian government violated
its commitment, it could have diminished the credibility of amnesty offers
and made it less likely that future perpetrators of atrocities would be
willing to leave power voluntarily.
Recently, some commentators have suggested that even when asylum
is an option the ICC is likely to deter humanitarian offenders. For instance,
Gilligan has argued that because some dictators might sometimes prefer to
surrender to the ICC than stay in power, the ICC will lower the value of
committing atrocities even when asylum is an available alternative. 57
' The
problem with this analysis is that it assumes that countries that agree to
provide asylum to dictators are going to be largely indifferent to the
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existence of indictments. But if the countries that are likely to be safe
havens for dictators are unable to commit credibly to asylum bargains
because of international pressure, the ICC will tend to weaken the value of
asylum bargains in the first place.
In sum, the notion that seeking justice through international tribunals
facilitates peace-building in weak states is often misguided. As a postconflict reconstruction tactic, prosecutions by international tribunals may
actually create stumbling blocks for more politically realistic alternatives
58
to address past grievances, including amnesty, exile, or lustration. 1
Of course, we are not suggesting that ICT investigations will always
jeopardize efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to an ongoing humanitarian
crisis. For instance, in circumstances where peace has been forcibly
imposed on the belligerents and the ICT investigations enjoy substantial
local support, investigations may prove to be a salutary mechanism for
holding the worst humanitarian offenders accountable. Indeed, one of the
circumstances that made the Nuremberg trials a practical option after the
end of World War II was the existence of a clear military victory and the
commitment by the Allied forces to occupy Germany until peace was
established. But these preconditions do not necessarily exist elsewhere,
especially among weak states where the extent of military victories is
usually ambiguous and the commitment by occupying powers to stay the
course is generally weak. In other words, if a government in a weak state
simply lacks the capacity to subdue a belligerent by force, then threatening
the belligerent with an international criminal prosecution-as the ICC is
currently doing in the Ugandan civil war-is likely to be misguided and
counterproductive. After all, if the Ugandan army could apprehend or kill
the leaders of the LRA on its own, it would have every incentive to do so
even without the intervention of the ICC. As Snyder and Vinjamuri have
suggested elsewhere, "[a]ttempting to implement universal standards of
criminal justice in the absence of . . . political and institutional
preconditions risks weakening norms of justice by revealing
their
' 159
ineffectiveness and hindering necessary political bargaining."

158. Lustration is a sanction that involves banning perpetrators from holding public office. See
Michael P. Sharf, From the Exile Files: An Essay on Trading Justicefor Peace, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 339, 346 (2006).
159. See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trial and Error: Principle and Pragmatism in
Strategies of InternationalJustice, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5, 6 (2004); see also Tonya Putnam, Human
Rights and Sustainable Peace, in ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE
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B. Political Opportunism Effects
Proponents of ICTs often argue that ICT prosecutions will spur
beneficial institutional reform in weak states. 160 In this section, we suggest
that the opposite is more likely true: ICT prosecutions will often cause
politicians in weak states to under-invest in the kinds of institutional
reforms necessary to avoid humanitarian atrocities in the first place. If
local politicians believe that they can use ICT investigations to demonize
political opponents or use them to scapegoat others for their own failures
to deal effectively with humanitarian abuses in their communities, they
may elect to turn a blind eye to the hard political decisions that will reduce
the risks that a budding civil war will escalate into a humanitarian crisis.
Thus, an ICT regime that is designed to insure against humanitarian
atrocities may inadvertently promote the kind of imprudent risk-taking
behavior that worsens such atrocities.
Various commentators have recently observed that political regimes in
weak states will often embrace the rhetoric of international justice norms
for narrow political objectives that have very little to do with promoting
justice and meaningful institutional reform. 16' Furthermore, the notion that
politicians exploit external assistance efforts to avoid making hard but
necessary institutional reform choices is a common theme in the literature
on African political economy. For instance, Uvin has shown how the
increase in foreign assistance after the Rwandan genocide allowed the
ruling regime to continue to sidestep critical reform measures and
disregard the interests of its citizens.' 62 De Waal has also shown that
distributions from famine relief in East Africa were often used
strategically by politicians to shield poor governance and weather political

to human rights abuses occurring in stable societies with established governments.").
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resistance from disaffected groups. 163 Analogously, commentators have
examined how the prospect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) bail-out
efforts often encourages politicians to ignore structural adjustment
commitments and engage in shortsighted fiscal policies in order to sustain
short-term political gains. 164 Finally, and more importantly, Reno has
documented how the Ugandan government has exploited creditor anxieties
about growing disorder in weak states to suspend necessary institutional
reform. 165
Of course, if ICTs were able to intervene and provide corrective justice
in every instance where an otherwise viable domestic alternative might
have been an option, this political opportunism dynamic might not
influence the level of humanitarian crimes. In practice, however, the
decisions by ICTs to investigate atrocities are subject to a whole range of
political and resource-related constraints. First, since the ICTs lack any
enforcement powers of their own, they must rely on member states to
apprehend suspects. 166 But as Goldsmith observes, "Nations do not lightly
expend national blood and treasure to stop human rights abusers in other
nations." ' 167 Indeed, the failure of the international community to provide
the ICC with any military or police support to capture Kony after he was
indicted for his role in the Ugandan crisis reflects the inability of ICTs to
pick up the slack for dysfunctional institutions in weak states. Second,
given that politicians in weak states will often have an incentive to use
ICT referrals strategically to delegitimize political opponents, nothing
insures that any ICT referral will generate positive spillover effects for
domestic institutions.
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Simply put, ICTs will often enable politicians in weak states to escape
accountability and avoid making hard policy decisions in the context of a
crisis-exactly the opposite of what would be socially optimal for
domestic institutional reform. In the context of African humanitarian
crises or civil wars, this perverse dynamic also depends on the fact that
African governments may often have an incentive to encourage corrupt
and unprofessional military behavior. For instance, it probably should
come as no surprise that the Ugandan government has fared so terribly
against a poorly organized adversary that is led by a high-school dropout
and former altar boy who claims to be "possessed by spirits, including168a
Sudanese, Chinese, American, and a former minister of Ida Amin."'
Indeed, much of the carnage in the Ugandan civil war can be traced largely
to the pervasive corruption and disorganization of the Ugandan military.16 9
As one NGO group involved in the conflict has observed, "the Ugandan
military has failed to protect civilian populations not only from the LRA
but also from its own troops, who have come in some cases to be the
major source of insecurity .... ,,170 But the Ugandan military's disabilities
are not obviously accidental; there is now a general consensus that the
Ugandan army's forays into the Congolese civil war in the late 1990s were
motivated by President Museveni's desire to extract mineral resources and
defend diamond and gold mines that his generals operated for personal
gain.171 In other instances, the plundered goods from Congo were used to
supplement Ugandan state coffers; financial data from the Ugandan
government show that Ugandan gold exports rose from less than $13
million in 1994-1995 to $110 million in 1996-1997.172
The incentive for insecure African regimes to corrupt their militaries by
outsourcing revenue collection underscores the perverse logic of initiating
ICT prosecutions amidst ongoing military disputes. According to this
logic, Ugandan President Museveni's decision to seek an ICC referral in
2003 might be no more than a poorly disguised attempt to cloak his
foundering military campaign against the LRA with international
legitimacy. Indeed, Article 17 of the Rome Statue provides that the ICC

168. Vinci, supra note 113, at 365.
169. See Ssenyonjo, supra note 135, at 431-32 (observing that according to the Ugandan
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will step in only where the domestic legal system involved is unwilling or
unable to prosecute. 173 But Uganda's institutional problems in prosecuting
LRA leaders have more to do with its military than its courts; there is very
little evidence that the Ugandan courts would be institutionally incapable
of prosecuting Kony if he were captured. Thus, a more plausible
explanation for the Ugandan referral to the ICC is that Museveni hopes
that the ICC's warrants against the LRA leaders will renew international
support for his regime and increase the chance of an outright military
victory over the LRA. Moreover, given the contemporary political
problems he is facing, including his widely condemned but successful
effort to win a third term in office, 114 Museveni likely believes that any
effort to seek a peaceful compromise with the LRA will jeopardize his
political future. But why, one might ask, should the ICC provide Museveni
with an opportunity to free ride on the coattails of an international legal
regime that is ostensibly designed to encourage governmental
accountability?
Beyond the Ugandan experience, there is ample evidence that regimes
in weak states welcome ICT prosecutions only when those prosecutions
support the regime's narrow political prerogatives. Often, these
prerogatives are at odds with the holistic diffusion of international norms
of justice purportedly embraced by ICTs. In Rwanda, the ruling Tutsi
regime has selectively embraced the ICTR's prosecution of its Hutu
political opponents but has balked at cooperating with the tribunal's
efforts to investigate and prosecute Tutsi individuals.' 75 In Congo, almost
every likely target of the ICC's investigation turned out to be one of
Kabila's powerful political opponents. 176 In Yugoslavia, the Croatian
government actively supported the ICTY's efforts to investigate and
prosecute Serbians accused of war crimes, but promptly suspended its
support once the first Croatians were indicted. 177 Thus, in case after case,
regimes in weak states seem to be reluctant to support ICT investigations
when regime supporters are likely targets. Conversely, these same regimes

173. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 17.
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seem eager to embrace ICT investigations when the likely targets are their
political opponents. Therefore, to the extent that ICT investigations are
used selectively to vindicate the political objectives of the ruling regime,
such investigations will likely undermine rather than promote the dual
goals of promoting transitional justice and facilitating institutional reform.
Ultimately, it seems reasonable to conclude that the primary obligation
to prevent humanitarian atrocities rests with the state in which the
atrocities take place, and by extension, its rulers. If a regime decides to
trade corrective institutional reform for corrupt rent-seeking opportunities,
however, it is not clear why the ICC should intervene and provide political
cover to that regime when a crisis unfolds. To outside observers, having
the ICC help the leaders of Uganda and Congo consolidate their authority
by hunting down alleged war criminals may seem like a small price to pay
for achieving international justice. But the victims of these conflicts likely
have very different visions of the relationship between the ICC and their
governments. Perhaps that is why most of the representatives of the LRA
victims in northern Uganda, as well as the mediators in that conflict, have
accused the ICC of turning a blind eye to their concerns in that region's
crisis. 178

VII. CONCLUSION
We live in a golden age of international criminal tribunals. Between the
creation of the permanent International Criminal Court and the continued
reliance on ad hoc ICTs created by the U.N. Security Council, the world
has never before witnessed the frequency of independent international
criminal prosecutions that is occurring today. Nonetheless, the empirical
and theoretical assumptions that underpin the deterrence rationale for these
ICTs remain dubious or highly debatable. Supporters of ICTs generally
assume that a pervasive "culture of impunity" exists in certain states and
that by ending such a culture, ICT prosecutions will eventually deter
future atrocities.
This Article challenges this "culture of impunity" thesis as well as the
assumption that ICTs deter future humanitarian atrocities. We apply an
economic model of deterrence to analyze the incentives facing likely
targets of ICT prosecutions-coup participants involved in civil conflicts
within weak states. Such a data set is particularly relevant because for both
legal and political reasons ICT prosecutions will almost exclusively target
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those committing atrocities in conflicts occurring within weak or failed
states.
Our model and data suggest that any deterrence effect of ICT
prosecutions, whether ad hoc or via the permanent ICC, is likely to be
marginal given the existence of a range of preexisting sanctions in weak
states. Potential ICT targets, who are the only individuals likely to be
deterred by the threat of an ICT prosecution, already face a substantial
likelihood of informal sanctions (such as death, imprisonment, and torture)
of greater severity and certainty than any sanction likely to be meted out
by an ICT. Given the very low likelihood of actually facing an ICT
prosecution, and the significant constraints ICTs face in administering
sanctions, we believe ICT prosecutions will be unlikely to have any
meaningful deterrence effect.
Furthermore, we suggest that the high incidence of humanitarian
atrocities in weak states might have more to do with the offenders'
opportunities to commit atrocities rather than their willingness to do so.
These opportunities typically arise in weak or failed states because such
states usually lack the institutional ability to incapacitate potential
humanitarian offenders. In other words, developing an effective
framework for addressing humanitarian atrocities might have less to do
with initiating international prosecutions, and more to do with building
robust domestic institutions in weak states that can successfully channel
political participation and dispute resolution.
We also suggest that ICT prosecutions might not only fail to deter
humanitarian offenders, but might actually exacerbate atrocities. First, ICT
prosecutions that are initiated outside of a state's domestic processes
might demand the removal and arrest of politically indispensable figures
prior to the resolution of a civil conflict. As a number of current conflicts
in Africa already demonstrate, even initiating an international prosecution
might fatally undermine the prospects of peace negotiations. Second, the
growing ICT institutional framework might distort the incentives of
leaders in weak states to engage in the kinds of constructive reform efforts
that will thwart future humanitarian atrocities. In other words, rather than
invest in building domestic institutions that can incapacitate domestic
offenders, leaders of such states will often seek to use the threat of an ICT
prosecution to achieve narrow political objectives that will often be
inconsistent with the norm-promotion goals of ICTs.
Of course, our analysis should be treated with some caution because
there have been too few ICT prosecutions to perform the kinds of
econometric tests that would generate systematic empirical results. But
even if it seems early to make concrete empirical generalizations about the
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effects of ICT prosecutions, we might still be able to make plausible
inferences about the likelihood of deterrence given the availability of
alternative sanctions. In essence, although the empirical evidence
presented here is largely exploratory and descriptive, it suggests reasons to
be wary of the deterrence promise of ICTs. Should the international
community completely abandon ICTs in favor of purely political or local
approaches to combating humanitarian atrocities? We do not presume to
answer that question. What we do know is that it is dangerously naYve to
ignore the possibility that ICTs might not only lack any significant
deterrence benefits, but might actually exacerbate conflicts in weak states.

